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Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and 
Economic Integration of Europe 
abstract.   In recent years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has invalidated many 
income tax law provisions of European Union (EU) member states as violating European 
constitutional treaty guarantees of freedom of movement for goods, services, persons, and 
capital. These decisions have not, however, been matched by significant EU income tax 
legislation, because no EU political institution has the power to enact such legislation without 
unanimous consent from the member states. In this Article, we describe how the developing ECJ 
jurisprudence threatens the ability of member states to use tax incentives to stimulate their 
domestic economies and to resolve problems of international double taxation. We conclude that 
the ECJ approach is ultimately incoherent because it is a quest for an unattainable goal in the 
absence of harmonized income tax bases and rates: to eliminate discrimination based on both 
origin and destination of economic activity. We also compare the ECJ’s jurisprudence with the 
resolution of related issues in international taxation and the U.S. taxation of interstate 
commerce, and we consider the potential responses of both the European Union and the United 
States to these developments. 
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introduction 
Whither Europe? That is the question newspapers and pundits asked 
repeatedly after the French and the Dutch rejected the proposed European 
Constitution in the summer of 2005. But that question was a perplexing one 
long before these summer setbacks. And, even if the new constitution is 
ultimately approved, the question will persist. Here, we explore one critical 
aspect of European integration, focusing on the tax aspects of European 
constitutional arrangements set out in the European treaties—arrangements 
that will remain unchanged under the new constitution if it is eventually 
ratified. Our principal conclusion is that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is 
undermining the fiscal autonomy of member states by articulating an 
interpretation of income tax arrangements that is ultimately unstable. In 
particular, the court has invalidated a number of European Union (EU) 
member state tax provisions in a manner that unsettles member states’ 
longstanding mechanisms for both avoiding international double taxation and 
protecting against international tax avoidance. The court’s decisions also 
threaten the ability of member states to use tax incentives to stimulate their 
economies.  
The actions of the ECJ must be understood within Europe’s broader 
institutional context. The court’s tax doctrine rests on its interpretation of the 
central freedoms guaranteed by Europe’s governing treaties. With the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957, six countries—Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—came together to form a “common 
market” known as the European Economic Community.1 In addition to 
“mak[ing] war unthinkable” in Western Europe,2 the motivating idea of this 
treaty was to increase economic interdependence, primarily through increased 
trade between these member states. In 1973, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark joined; Greece entered in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 
1986. These twelve members agreed to the Single European Act of 1986, which 
defined an area committed to “the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital.”3 These are frequently labeled the “four freedoms,” and they are 
 
1.  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1958). The Treaty of Rome was itself a successor to the 1951 
Treaty of Paris, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, which established the European Coal and 
Steel Community, comprising the same six nations and eliminating tariffs on coal and steel. 
2.  ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 46 (2004). 
3.  Single European Act art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. The Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, incorporated the guarantees of 
the Single European Act: freedom of movement for workers, id. art. 39, freedom of 
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now incorporated into the European Community (EC) Treaty and included in 
the proposed European Constitution.4 
Subsequent treaties expanded the European experiment and established 
various institutions to advance its mission. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht 
created the EU—a political union cooperating in foreign policy, defense, and 
criminal law, in addition to economic relations.5 The same year, a majority of 
member states adopted the Euro as the EU’s currency and established a new 
European central bank to supply a common monetary policy throughout most 
of the Union. The monetary union agreement also imposed specific budgetary 
responsibilities on the member states. Through the Stability and Growth Pact, 
these countries agreed to limit their fiscal deficits to three percent of GDP—a 
limitation that has proved unenforceable.6 Membership in the EU now stands 
at twenty-five, and twelve member states use the Euro as their common 
currency.7 
The political and legal institutions that govern the EU do not fit easily into 
familiar categories. Some scholars describe the EU as a pooling of sovereignty.8 
 
establishment, id. arts. 43, 48, freedom to provide services, id. art. 49, and freedom of 
movement of capital, id. arts. 56, 58. 
4.  Article I-4 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe states: “The free movement 
of persons, services, goods and capital, and freedom of establishment shall be guaranteed 
within and by the Union, in accordance with the Constitution.” Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, art. I-4, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1. 
5.  The EU expanded to fifteen members by adding Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. The 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 consolidated and renumbered the articles of the EU and the 
EC treaties, and in 2001 the Treaty of Nice somewhat revised the EU’s governance in 
anticipation of its expansion to at least twenty-five members. See Treaty of Amsterdam 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1; Treaty of Nice 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1. For subsequent 
citations to articles in the European treaties, we refer to the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. For further background, see RUTH MASON, PRIMER ON DIRECT 
TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1-3 (2005). The European treaties (and Europe’s 
proposed constitution) can be amended (or adopted) only through the unanimous vote of 
the member states, typically followed by ratification at the national level either by the 
national legislature or by a referendum. 
6.  See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Euro and the Stability Pact (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11,249, 2005). 
7.  In addition to the countries already mentioned, EU members include Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
8.  E.g., Robert O. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann, Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s, in 
THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 7 (Robert O. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991). 
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Others regard it as a blend of international law, national constitutional law, 
and federalism.9 In any event, the rights and obligations of the treaties apply to 
the member states and to the citizens of those states, as well as to the EU’s 
governing institutions.10 
There are four organizations that promulgate and enforce EU rules: (1) the 
European Parliament (Parliament), which is the only EU governing institution 
whose members are directly elected by the people;11 (2) the European Council 
of Members (Council), which is composed of sitting ministers of member state 
governments who have the authority to bind their member states; (3) the 
European Commission (Commission), which has the exclusive power to draft 
and propose legislation and to implement EU policy; and (4) the ECJ 
(formerly the Court of Justice of the European Communities), which serves as 
the EU’s constitutional court. 
The unique institutional structure of the EU has limited the ability of 
legislative bodies to formulate member state income tax policy while 
permitting the ECJ to take a prominent role. In sum, neither the Parliament, 
the Council, nor the Commission has the authority to adopt Europe-wide 
income tax measures without a level of consensus that is typically not 
achievable except in technical and relatively uncontroversial matters. Although 
the treaties have increasingly involved the Parliament in legislation and have 
expanded its powers over time (as a way of narrowing Europe’s democracy 
deficit), its authority remains limited. Most of Parliament’s enactments must 
be approved by the Council before taking effect.12 
Though the Council—considered the EU’s “intergovernmental center of 
gravity”13—has the power to regulate commerce among member states and to 
decide other issues, its authority is also circumscribed. The finance ministers of 
the member states make up the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN), which has responsibility for tax matters,14 but they cannot act on 
income tax issues without unanimous agreement. Consequently, any member 
 
9.  E.g., James A. Caporaso, The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or 
Post-Modern?, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 29 (1996); Alberta M. Sbragia, The European 
Community: A Balancing Act, PUBLIUS, Summer 1993, at 23. 
10.  Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport—en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. 
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
11.  The Parliament’s 732 members serve five-year terms. MASON, supra note 5, at 4-6. 
12.  See Tracy A. Kaye, Tax Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and EU Approaches, 7 
FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 11, on file with authors). 
13.  STONE SWEET, supra note 2, at 47. 
14.  MASON, supra note 5, at 7 n.57. 
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state can veto any proposal.15 In addition, before issuing “directives” or 
regulations on tax matters, the Council is required to consult with Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee, which is an advisory body consisting 
of 350 people who represent “various categories of economic and social 
activity.”16 
The Council is further constrained by the fact that it can act only on 
proposals of the Commission (although it can request that the Commission 
study specific issues). There are twenty-five commissioners, one from each 
member state. Rather than representing a particular country, each 
commissioner is responsible for a substantive area of EU legislation and 
regulation. The Commission is the moving force behind most policy initiatives 
and has often announced its tax policy goals in communications to the Council, 
the Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee.17 The Commission 
also represents the EU in international organizations including the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Upon a recommendation of the 
Commission, the Council—subject to the unanimity and consultation 
requirements—may issue directives on tax matters. Needless to say, adopting 
directives is a slow and cumbersome process, subject to the veto of any member 
state, and, as a result, only a few income tax directives have been issued.18 
 
15.  An early draft of the proposed European Constitution would have allowed majority voting 
on corporate income tax provisions, but the final draft retained the unanimity requirement, 
on which the United Kingdom and Ireland insisted. Brian Groom & Peter Norman, EU 
Leaders Draw Up Outline Deal on Treaty Revisions, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at 1. On other 
issues, Council decisions are made by simple majority, qualified majority, or unanimous 
vote, depending on the subject matter. The most common procedure is a qualified majority 
vote, which requires both a majority of member states (or in some cases, a two-thirds 
majority) and a minimum of 72.3% of total votes. Any member state may also insist that the 
vote represent 62% of the EU population in order to take effect. MASON, supra note 5, at 7; 
STONE SWEET, supra note 2, at 47. Votes in the Council are weighted, generally by the 
country’s size. There are a total of 321 votes. For example, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom have 29 votes each, while Slovenia has 4. The presidency of the Council rotates 
every six months among the member states. 
16.  EC Treaty art. 257. 
17.  E.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee: Tax Policy in the European Union—Priorities for the Years 
Ahead, COM (2001) 260 final (May 23, 2001) [hereinafter Communication on Tax Policy 
Priorities]. 
18.  There are a few directives applicable to the taxation of corporate income. E.g., Council 
Directive 2003/49, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 49 (concerning interest and royalty payments between 
related companies); Council Directive 90/434, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1, as amended by Council 
Directive 2005/19, 2005 O.J. (L 58) 19 (concerning mergers); Council Directive 90/435, 1990 
O.J. (L 225) 6, as amended by Council Directive 2003/123, 2004 O.J. (L 7) 41 (concerning 
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However, the Commission does have an alternative to these labyrinthine 
procedures. The Commission—whose members are required to act 
independently of their member states’ governments and to promote the EU’s 
interests19—has the power to initiate enforcement actions against member 
states and often brings cases to the ECJ. 
The ECJ has jurisdiction to resolve disputes between member states, 
between EU institutions and member states, and between the various EU 
institutions. Its twenty-five judges also hear cases involving issues of European 
law referred to it by the national courts of the member states. Judges are 
appointed by each of the member states for a renewable six-year term. The ECJ 
cases we shall discuss here are generally either (1) actions brought by the 
Commission against a member state claiming that the member state’s law 
violates one or more of its obligations under the EC Treaty or (2) requests by 
national courts for an ECJ ruling interpreting European legal or treaty 
requirements in lawsuits involving private parties. Eight advocates general 
serve the court by issuing opinions on cases before the court itself acts. Much 
of the time the court follows the opinion issued by the advocate general. ECJ 
decisions are rendered by a majority vote, and neither the vote nor any 
dissenting opinions are published.20 To date, the ECJ has decided more than 
one hundred cases involving income tax issues, with the vast majority striking 
down member states’ tax provisions on the ground that they violate either one 
of the four freedoms guaranteed by the treaties or the treaties’ bar against 
discrimination on the basis of nationality. 
While the EU’s basic separation of powers is familiar to Americans, its 
specific contours are not. Stripped of all political, social, and economic context, 
one would be hard pressed to predict whether these institutions would 
generally operate to expand supranational governance over the member states 
or to inhibit it. But—at least until the ratification setbacks of the summer of 
2005—both European politics and the growing social and economic 
interdependence within the EU have promoted integration, with greater power 
and control moving toward the center. Removing barriers to trade, investment, 
work, and immigration within the EU, along with unifying most of its 
 
parent-subsidiary taxation); see also Council Directive 2003/48, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38 
(concerning savings); Council Directive 77/799, 1977 O.J. (L 336) 15, as amended by Council 
Directive 79/1070, 1979 O.J. (L 331) 8, and Council Directive 92/12, 1992 O.J. (L 76) 1 
(concerning mutual assistance). 
19.  EC Treaty art. 213. 
20.  For a comparison of French, U.S., and ECJ decisions, see MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, 
JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND 
LEGITIMACY (2004). 
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monetary system, has produced enormous momentum toward the political 
center. 
The institution that has, so far at least, most spurred such centripetal force 
has been the ECJ. We agree generally with Alec Stone Sweet’s conclusion that 
the ECJ has transformed the EU, enhancing its supranational power and 
“federalizing” its policy.21 As he puts it: “Today, the ECJ has no rival as the 
most effective supranational judicial body in the history of the world, 
comparing favorably with the most powerful constitutional courts 
anywhere.”22 More than two decades ago Eric Stein famously summed up the 
ECJ’s work: “Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, 
until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities has fashioned a 
constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe.”23 
There is now emerging, however, a serious question about whether the ECJ 
can (or will) continue to move political and economic power away from the 
member states to the EU’s governing institutions. Through its decisions in 
income tax cases, the ECJ is bumping headlong into the member states’ 
retained power to tax and their veto power over any European tax legislation. 
Individual member states have held on fiercely to their sovereign right to 
impose income taxes even as they have integrated economically in their treaties 
through free trade and the free movement of workers, residents, goods, 
services, and capital (and through the monetary union). The ECJ has the 
power only to negate tax provisions of member states. No European institution 
has the power to mandate income tax rules—except with unanimous consent 
from the member states. However, by striking down specific income tax 
provisions of the member states as incompatible with the EU treaties—
generally with little regard for the internal logic or consistency of member state 
 
21.  STONE SWEET, supra note 2, at 1. 
22.  Id. Miguel Poiares Maduro goes further to argue that the ECJ engages in “majoritarian 
activism” and “judicial harmonisation” to reach a regulatory balance that normally 
corresponds to the view of the Commission and to legislation in the majority of member 
states. MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND 
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 68 (1998). Maduro writes: “The conclusion to be 
drawn is that what is taking place in the Court is a kind of Community legislative process, 
with the Court trying to harmonise national rules in accordance with an ‘ideally drafted’ 
representation of all States’ interests.” Id. at 78. As will become apparent later in this Article, 
we do not find that Professor (now Advocate General) Maduro’s description is apt in the 
context of the ECJ’s income tax decisions. See infra Parts III-IV. 
23.  Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 
1 (1981); cf. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (arguing 
that the transformation of Europe must also be understood as a political process). 
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tax systems or for the effects on their finances—the ECJ is eroding the member 
states’ veto power over any European authority to conform or harmonize 
member state income taxes. 
An irresistible force is now confronting an immovable object. The ultimate 
question is whether the current mixture of unification and separatism can 
endure. If not, what are the implications for the future of Europe? As we shall 
show in some detail, this is the fundamental issue raised by the income tax 
decisions of the ECJ. We begin by analyzing those decisions and identifying 
the negative legal and fiscal policy implications for member states. We then 
consider the potential responses of both the European Union and the United 
States. 
i. company taxation in the european court of justice 
To an American reader, the description of ECJ cases that follows will sound 
somewhat familiar. It echoes to some degree cases decided by the Supreme 
Court under our own Constitution.24 But, rather than tracing these doctrinal 
analogues, we shall instead examine these decisions through the lens of 
nondiscrimination—a concept developed principally through the ECJ’s 
interpretations of the four freedoms. Since our concern here is not with a 
doctrinal analysis of the ECJ’s decisions but with the implications of its 
jurisprudence for the economic and political future of Europe (and for the 
trading partners of Europe, including the United States), we are selective in 
our analysis of ECJ cases—confining our discussion largely to ECJ decisions 
involving corporate and shareholder income taxes. Empirical evidence now 
makes clear that companies’ decisions about where to locate facilities are 
responsive to corporate income tax differences,25 and it has become 
commonplace for nations to use corporate taxes as a means of competing for 
such facilities. We begin by showing how the ECJ has adopted a different and 
more expansive view of nondiscrimination than is demanded by international 
trade and income tax agreements. 
 
24.  See infra Section IV.A. 
25.  See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment, 2 TAX POL’Y & 
ECON. 33 (1988). 
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A. Discrimination Against International Commerce Under International Trade 
and Tax Treaties 
There are three principal ways in which a country might use its income tax 
to discriminate against international commerce. It could favor domestic 
products over foreign products, domestic producers over foreign producers, or 
domestic production over foreign production.26 
Discrimination against foreign products (including services) is the domain 
of the multilateral treaties, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and its successors (enforced by the WTO), that govern international 
trade.27 These agreements limit not only tariffs on imports, but also subsidies 
for exports, which are sometimes thought to favor domestic products over 
foreign products in foreign markets. Income tax incentives for exports are 
subject to these limits, as the United States has learned on several occasions.28 
Whether the GATT should be read to constrain other income tax provisions is 
more controversial.29 If so, the agreements could inhibit a country from 
limiting income tax benefits, such as accelerated depreciation or investment tax 
credits, to machinery and equipment produced locally. 
Income tax discrimination against foreign producers is the domain of the 
bilateral treaties that govern international tax relations.30 These agreements 
 
26.  For a fuller discussion of these possibilities, see Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax 
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131 (2001). 
27.  Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994); General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1167 (1994); Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994); General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
28.  See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, Trade Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions, Conflicts, and 
Resolutions, 57 TAX L. REV. 275 (2004) (tracing the history of the GATT and WTO decisions 
holding that U.S. tax preferences were impermissible export subsidies under the trade 
treaties). 
29.  The more recent GATT treaties provide exceptions from trade treaty obligations for income 
tax and tax treaty provisions. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues Through Trade 
Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1683 (2001); Servaas van Thiel, General Report, in WTO AND 
DIRECT TAXATION 13, 17-25 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2005). 
30.  See ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON 
CAPITAL art. 24 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. 2005) [hereinafter OECD MODEL 
CONVENTION], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/49/35363840.pdf. There are 
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typically prohibit a country in which income is produced (usually called the 
source country) from taxing foreign enterprises operating in that country more 
heavily than similarly situated domestic enterprises.31 A source country could 
not therefore tax business income earned in that country by a foreign company 
at a rate higher than that applied to comparable income earned by a domestic 
company. Nor could a source country limit income tax benefits, such as 
accelerated depreciation or investment tax credits, to machinery and equipment 
owned by domestic companies. 
Neither trade nor tax treaties prohibit discrimination against domestic 
companies’ income from foreign production. Such discrimination will arise if a 
company’s home country (the residence country) taxes the company’s foreign 
income more heavily than its domestic income. Rather than treating a 
residence country’s taxation of its enterprises’ foreign income as a matter of 
discrimination, the tax treaties conceptualize the problem as international 
double taxation, which arises because both source and residence countries can 
assert taxing jurisdiction. Framing the issue this way has obscured the analysis 
of whether foreign production is being treated better or worse than domestic 
production, because the baseline of equivalent treatment often is not explicitly 
articulated. 
There are two standard residence-country methods for reducing double 
taxation of foreign income under both national law and the bilateral tax 
treaties.32 The first is to tax foreign income, but then to grant a tax credit for 
 
more than 2500 bilateral tax treaties in effect, mostly between developed countries. These 
treaties generally have in common the key structural features of the OECD Model 
Convention. See KEES VAN RAAD, NONDISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW (1986); 
Mary Bennett, Nondiscrimination in International Tax Law: A Concept in Search of a Principle, 
59 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 5, on file with authors). 
31.  Because the focus of this Article is income taxation, it is natural to think of tax 
discrimination against foreign persons as being against foreign producers. Other kinds of 
tax discrimination against foreign persons are, however, conceivable. For example, a country 
might impose a special tax on domestic hotel rooms rented by foreign persons, whether the 
hotel was owned by domestic or foreign interests. 
32.  A third possibility emerges from the concept of “national neutrality,” which argues for a 
deduction for foreign taxes, rather than a credit or exemption, to alleviate international 
double taxation. The key idea here is that domestic and foreign taxes are different because a 
country benefits only from the taxes it collects. From this perspective, domestic income 
before taxes should be compared with foreign income after taxes, so a deduction for the 
latter is appropriate. If equal treatment after deduction for foreign taxes (and national 
neutrality) were considered the appropriate baseline, the credit and exemption methods of 
alleviating double taxation would favor foreign over domestic production. From the 
perspective of those two methods, however, alleviating double taxation by a deduction for 
foreign taxes, which is not acceptable under the typical tax treaty, would discriminate 
against foreign production. Although not explicitly framed as a nondiscrimination 
GRAETZWARREN 4/10/2006 3:29:31 PM 
income tax discrimination 
1197 
 
taxes paid on such income in the source country (a foreign tax credit). The 
most common rationale offered for this method is capital export neutrality, 
under which a company should pay the same marginal rate of taxation on its 
income from investment at home and abroad. The goal of this approach is to 
subject all of a taxpayer’s business activity to the same overall level of taxation, 
regardless of the location of the investment. However, to avoid refunding taxes 
paid to another nation, the foreign tax credit is generally limited to the rate of 
tax in the residence country,33 so investment abroad will bear a heavier tax 
burden than investment at home if the source country’s tax rate is higher. 
The second method for reducing international double taxation is for the 
residence country to exempt foreign income. The usual rationale offered here is 
capital import neutrality, which requires that all investments in a given country 
bear the same marginal rate of income taxation, regardless of the residence of 
the investor. This approach would subject all business activity within a specific 
country to the same overall level of taxation, whether the activity is conducted 
by a resident or a foreigner.34 
Under the foreign tax credit (and capital export neutrality), a residence 
country should not treat foreign production any worse than domestic 
production, given the baseline of equal after-tax returns. On the other hand, 
under an exemption for foreign income (and capital import neutrality), a 
residence country may treat foreign production better than domestic 
production to achieve equal treatment with domestic production in the source 
country, given the same baseline. 
Other than mandating relief of international double taxation by a credit or 
exemption, there is no provision in the international trade and tax treaties that 
explicitly precludes a residence country from discriminating against foreign 
production by its nationals, whatever the appropriate baseline. Suppose that a 
residence country that used a foreign tax credit to eliminate international 
double taxation also applied higher rates to foreign income than to domestic 
income. Although this result would not be consistent with the capital export 
neutrality rationale usually thought to underlie the credit, such a provision 
would not seem to violate any obligation of the treaties unless the higher rate 
 
requirement, the treaty requirement of either a credit or exemption could, from this 
perspective, be considered such a requirement. See PEGGY BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1963). 
33.  E.g., I.R.C. § 904 (West Supp. 2005). 
34.  For more on capital export and import neutrality, as well as a critical evaluation of the role 
these concepts play in the analysis of international taxation, see Michael J. Graetz, Taxing 
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 
TAX L. REV. 261 (2001). 
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effectively eliminated the benefit of the credit. Rather than taxing foreign 
income more heavily, the more common practice is to offer tax benefits for 
domestic income. An example of this form of discrimination in the U.S. tax 
code is the deduction for nine percent of “income attributable to domestic 
production activities.”35 For economic policy reasons, the United States has 
chosen in this provision to favor domestic over foreign production by U.S. 
taxpayers—a preference that is not precluded by the trade and tax treaties. 
Another example of this sort of preference is the common limitation of income 
tax incentives, such as accelerated depreciation or investment tax credits, to 
machinery and equipment used domestically.36 
To recapitulate, trade and tax treaties forbid nations from adopting two of 
three discriminatory practices. Trade treaties constrain discrimination against 
foreign products or, correlatively, in favor of domestic exports. The 
nondiscrimination concept in the tax treaties prohibits source-country 
discrimination against foreign producers. However, neither the trade nor the 
tax treaties prevent a residence country from favoring domestic production 
over foreign production by its own taxpayers. In the next Section, we show 
that the ECJ’s jurisprudence is consistent with international practice on the 
first two of these dimensions. On the third, however, the ECJ has gone further, 
limiting the ability of member states to favor domestic over foreign production 
by their own companies. After analyzing both the legal and fiscal policy 
implications of the ECJ decisions, we will consider comparable decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court invalidating state tax laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce. 
B. The Corporate Income Tax Decisions of the ECJ 
As previously indicated, the principal legal basis for the ECJ corporate 
income tax decisions is the EC Treaty’s guarantee of freedom of movement for 
goods, persons, services, and capital. The Treaty also provides for 
nondiscrimination based on nationality,37 and precludes internal taxation of 
other member states’ products in excess of taxation of domestic products,38 as 
 
35.  I.R.C. § 199 (West Supp. 2005). 
36.  E.g., I.R.C. § 168(b), (g)(1)(A), (g)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005) (providing slower 
depreciation for tangible property used outside the United States). 
37.  EC Treaty art. 12. 
38.  Id. art. 90. 
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well as government subsidies (“state aid” in the language of the EC Treaty) 
incompatible with an internal market.39 
Our goal in this Section is to show that the ECJ decisions can be 
understood to prohibit discrimination on all three of the dimensions described 
above, a much more robust approach than that found in international trade 
and tax law. We do not, therefore, classify the decisions in terms of the various 
treaty freedoms or rights.40 Nor do we distinguish nationality discrimination 
from market restriction, a distinction sometimes deployed by the ECJ and its 
European commentators.41 More recent analyses suggest a growing awareness 
that these various rights and obligations taken together constitute a general 
prohibition of discrimination against commerce among member states.42 In the 
language of a recent advocate general’s opinion, national laws “must not result 
in less favourable treatment being accorded to transnational situations than to 
purely national situations.”43 It is in that spirit that we organize the ECJ 
decisions in terms of discrimination against foreign products, producers, and 
production. Our discussion is selective, rather than exhaustive, because our 
goal is simply to show that the ECJ jurisprudence occupies all three categories. 
The court has long invalidated member states’ laws or regulations that 
effectively discriminate against foreign products. One celebrated example is 
 
39.  Id. art. 87. 
40.  For classifications of the cases by Treaty freedom, see, for example, MATTIAS DAHLBERG, 
DIRECT TAXATION IN RELATION TO THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND THE FREE 
MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 71-83 (2005); ADOLFO J. MARTÍN JIMÉNEZ, TOWARDS CORPORATE 
TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL 
ANALYSIS 205-257 (1999); and MASON, supra note 5, at 37-92. 
41.  In European parlance, “discrimination” sometimes refers only to discrimination on the basis 
of nationality, and “restriction” to other cases in which cross-border income is taxed more 
heavily than domestic income. This distinction maps roughly, but not exactly, onto our 
distinction between discrimination against foreign producers (incoming investment) and 
foreign production (outgoing investment). See, e.g., DAHLBERG, supra note 40, at 107-13, 
327-29. 
42.  See, e.g., MICHEL DE WOLF, SOUVERAINETÉ FISCALE ET PRINCIPE DE NON DISCRIMINATION 453-
54 (2005); Hans-Jörgen Aigner et al., General Report, in CFC LEGISLATION, TAX TREATIES 
AND EC LAW 13, 38-43 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2004); Axel Cordewener et al., The Tax 
Treatment of Foreign Losses: Ritter, M & S, and the Way Ahead (Part Two), 44 EUR. TAX’N 218 
(2004). 
43.  Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, ¶ 37 (Apr. 7, 2005) (opinion of Advocate 
General Maduro), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-
446/03”). Advocate General Maduro also stated that the different criteria established by the 
ECJ for application of the Treaty freedoms, such as market access and nondiscrimination 
based on nationality, “all spring from the same source of inspiration which appears to me to 
be to prevent Member States from creating or maintaining in force measures promoting 
internal trade to the detriment of intra-community trade.” Id. ¶ 39. 
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Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (more commonly 
referred to as Cassis de Dijon),44 in which Germany had refused importation of 
a French liqueur because it did not meet a requirement of minimum alcohol 
content applicable to both domestic and foreign products. The court annulled 
the German provision on the ground that it effectively restricted importation of 
goods produced in another member state.45 An early decision invalidating an 
income tax provision because it discriminated against a foreign product or 
service is Commission v. France,46 in which certain French business deductions 
for newspapers were conditioned on the newspaper having been printed within 
France. The court reasoned that the provision was likely to restrict imports of 
publications printed in other member states, therefore having an effect 
equivalent to a restriction on imports. Other provisions the ECJ has held to 
violate the EC Treaty by taxing imported products and services more heavily 
than their domestic counterparts include: 
Sweden imposed a fifteen percent tax on premiums paid by Swedish 
residents to foreign life insurance companies, but not on premiums 
paid to Swedish companies.47 
 
Germany imposed a tax on German lessees of equipment, such as 
airplanes, but only if the lessors were foreign.48 
 
Denmark imposed greater restrictions on business deductions for 
meetings at foreign tourist sites than for meetings at Danish tourist 
sites.49 
 
Sweden limited deductions by employers of premiums on employee 
pension insurance to insurance purchased from Swedish companies.50 
 
44.  Case 120/78, 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
45.  See also Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837 (holding that Belgium 
could not exclude Scotch whisky already in circulation in France on the ground that the 
French exporter did not have a U.K. certificate of authenticity that would be required for 
direct importation into Belgium from the United Kingdom). 
46.  Case 18/84, 1985 E.C.R. 1339. 
47.  Case C-118/96, Safir v. Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Län, 1998 E.C.R. I-1897. The court 
rejected the argument that the tax was not discriminatory because Swedish insurance 
companies were subject to Swedish taxation, while foreign companies were not. 
48.  Case C-294/97, Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG v. Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna, 1999 E.C.R. I-
7447. The court rejected the argument that the provision was not discriminatory because 
German lessors would be subject to taxation in Germany. 
49.  Case C-55/98, Skatteministeriet v. Vestergaard, 1999 E.C.R. I-7641. 
50.  Case C-422/01, Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia (publ) v. Riksskatteverket, 2003 E.C.R. I-
6817. 
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Finland taxed residents on their winnings from foreign lotteries, but 
not from Finnish lotteries.51 
ECJ decisions sometimes fall into more than one category of discrimination 
in our framework because the three categories can overlap. For example, the 
Danish case in the list above involved a Danish entity that organized a foreign 
business meeting for Danish clients,52 so the decision involved both a foreign 
product and foreign production. We do not separately analyze such 
overlapping cases because our goal is simply to show that the ECJ 
jurisprudence operates on all three dimensions of discrimination. 
In addition to restricting discrimination against products imported from 
other member states, the ECJ has long constrained heavier taxation by source 
countries of enterprises from other member states. An early example of this 
second category of discrimination arose because dividends paid by French 
corporations to French insurance companies benefited from a tax credit, 
whereas such dividends paid to non-French insurance companies operating in 
France did not.53 The court reasoned that if France treated foreign companies 
operating in France on the same footing as French companies for the purpose 
of taxing their profits, it could not treat them differently with regard to a 
related tax advantage without giving rise to discrimination. 
An important recent example of potential discrimination against foreign 
producers is found in Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt.54 In that 
 
51.  Case C-42/02, In re Lindman, 2003 E.C.R. I-13,519. The court rejected the argument that the 
provision was not discriminatory because the organizers of Finnish lotteries could be subject 
to Finnish taxation. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the ECJ has decided a 
number of other cases involving imported products and services. See, e.g., Case C-334/02, 
Comm’n v. France, 2004 E.C.R. I-2229 (rejecting a policy allowing French holders of French 
debt to elect a lower tax rate, whereas French holders of foreign debt could not); Case C-
17/00, De Coster v. Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, 2001 
E.C.R. I-9445 (invalidating Belgium’s tax on satellite dishes when Belgian broadcasters, but 
not foreign broadcasters, had the option of using untaxed cable systems as an alternative); 
Case C-478/98, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2000 E.C.R. I-7587 (invalidating Belgium’s exclusion 
of noninstitutional Belgian investors from a Eurobond issuance by the Belgian government 
in German marks through German financial institutions); C-439/97, Sandoz GmbH v. 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland, 1999 E.C.R. I-7041 
(invalidating an Austrian stamp tax due on foreign borrowing when there was no written 
loan agreement and when no such tax would be due on borrowing from an Austrian lender). 
52.  Skatteministeriet, 1999 E.C.R. at I-7644. 
53.  Case 270/83, Comm’n v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273. These shareholder credits were part of an 
imputation system eliminating the double taxation of corporate income. We discuss such 
systems in Section II.A. 
54.  Case C-324/00, 2002 E.C.R. I-11,779. 
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case, the ECJ considered a law under which German subsidiaries of non-
German parent companies were denied deductions for interest paid to the 
foreign parent company when the subsidiary had a high debt-to-equity ratio, 
although such deductions were allowed for payments by German subsidiaries 
to German parent companies. The general purpose of such thin capitalization 
provisions, which are common in developed countries,55 is to prevent tax 
avoidance. Without such provisions, local subsidiaries of foreign parents could 
disguise nondeductible dividends as deductible interest, thereby shifting a 
portion of the corporate tax base from the source country to a lower-tax foreign 
country. In spite of that purpose, the ECJ held that applying such provisions to 
foreign, but not domestic, parent companies violated the treaty freedoms. 
Other examples of source-country discrimination against incoming investment 
invalidated by the ECJ include: 
The United Kingdom paid interest on U.K. tax refunds to U.K. 
companies but not on refunds to U.K. branches of non-U.K. 
companies.56 
 
Greece subjected Greek branches of foreign banks to a higher rate of tax 
than Greek banks.57  
 
The United Kingdom imposed an “advance corporate tax” on dividends 
of U.K. subsidiaries of non-U.K. parent companies but not on U.K. 
subsidiaries of U.K parent companies.58 
 
55.  E.g., I.R.C. § 163(j) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).  
56.  Case C-330/91, The Queen v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, 1993 E.C.R. I-4017. 
57.  Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Greece, 1999 E.C.R. I-2651. 
58.  Joined Cases C-397 & C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 2001 
E.C.R I-1727. The “advance corporate tax” was a component of an imputation system 
intended to reduce double taxation of corporate income. We discuss such systems in 
Subsection II.A.1. For additional cases involving source-country discrimination against 
incoming investment, see, for example, Case C-253/03, CLT-UFA SA v. Finanzamt Köln-
West (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case 
C-253/03”), which invalidated a higher German tax on a branch of a foreign company than 
on a German subsidiary of a foreign company; Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 
Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161, 
which struck down tax relief for foreign investments that was available for German 
companies, but not for such investments by foreign companies operating in Germany; and 
Case C-1/93, Halliburton Servs. BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 1994 E.C.R. I-1137, 
which invalidated a Dutch transfer tax exemption available only if both the transferor and 
transferee were Dutch companies. 
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As indicated in the previous Section, countries are generally free under the 
international trade and tax treaties to favor domestic production over foreign 
production by their own companies. The ECJ, on the other hand, has 
invalidated many provisions of this type, particularly in recent years. An 
important case in this category is Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey,59 which 
involved a British retailer whose Belgian, French, and German subsidiaries had 
suffered substantial losses and were eventually closed or sold. The key issue 
before the court was whether the United Kingdom had to allow Marks & 
Spencer to offset the foreign losses against its U.K. domestic taxable income. 
The litigation stimulated a great deal of interest and commentary in Europe 
because disallowance of losses of foreign subsidiaries is a common feature of 
member state tax systems, so the potential revenue loss was enormous.60 
Like many countries, the United Kingdom taxes U.K. corporations, 
including subsidiaries of U.K. parent companies, on domestic and foreign 
income (subject to a foreign tax credit). Foreign subsidiaries of U.K. companies 
are not generally subject to U.K. tax on their current income, but the U.K. 
parents are taxed on dividends received from foreign subsidiaries (also subject 
to a foreign tax credit). Under U.K. law, losses in domestic, but not foreign, 
subsidiaries can be used to offset income in U.K. parent companies. This 
system of “group relief” requires the subsidiary to “surrender” the loss to the 
parent, so it cannot be used twice. 
Before Marks & Spencer was referred to the ECJ, two of Europe’s leading 
international tax specialists, sitting as special commissioners of the U.K. 
Department of Inland Revenue, decided in favor of the government.61 They 
held that the failure to extend loss offsets to foreign subsidiaries did not violate 
the EC Treaty because the income of foreign subsidiaries was not subject to 
U.K. taxation. Citing previous ECJ decisions, the commissioners concluded 
that the U.K. taxation of dividends to parent companies was not germane 
because parent and subsidiary were different taxpayers. 
The ECJ Advocate General subsequently recommended that the U.K. 
provisions be struck down, interpreting the treaty freedoms to require no less 
 
59.  Case C-446/03 (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search 
for “Case C-446/03”). 
60.  E.g., Cordewener et al., supra note 42; Gerard T.K. Meussen, Cross-Border Loss Relief in the 
European Union Following the Advocate General’s Opinion in the Marks & Spencer Case, 45 
EUR. TAX’N 282 (2005); Lee A. Sheppard, Dowdy Retailer Set To Destroy European Corporate 
Tax, 104 TAX NOTES 16 (2004); Christian Wimpissinger, Beyond Marks & Spencer: Cross-
Border Losses and EC Law, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 923 (2005). 
61.  Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey, No. SPC 00352 (Dec. 17, 2002)  
(opinion of Special Comm’rs Jones & Gammie) (on file with authors). 
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favorable treatment for transnational than purely national investment 
situations.62 From this perspective, he concluded that investment abroad was 
disadvantaged relative to investment at home under U.K. law. While the U.K. 
special commissioners focused on the symmetrical treatment of foreign income 
and losses, the Advocate General focused on the fact that a U.K. parent and a 
domestic subsidiary could not both use a loss surrendered by the latter. 
Accordingly, the Advocate General concluded that the United Kingdom could 
not prevent the use by a U.K. parent company of the loss of a foreign 
subsidiary unless the latter was able to deduct or carry forward the loss in the 
source country. 
The ECJ reached the same result as the Advocate General, although 
without articulating any broad principles of interpretation.63 In the court’s 
view, the U.K. system of group relief was simply a tax advantage that could not 
be limited to domestic subsidiaries.64 It is easy to formulate the outcome as 
necessary to avoid discrimination against foreign production: Losses of 
domestic subsidiaries are available to offset income of U.K. parent companies 
(on the condition that the subsidiaries cannot use the losses); therefore losses 
 
62.  Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey (Apr. 7, 2005) (opinion of Advocate General 
Maduro), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-
446/03”). As indicated above, see supra text accompanying note 43, Advocate General 
Maduro suggested that Treaty freedoms should be considered related means to prevent 
measures promoting internal trade to the detriment of intracommunity trade. Id. ¶¶ 37, 39-
40. 
63.   The court stated its holding (“ruling” in ECJ parlance) as follows: 
As Community law now stands, Articles 43 EC and 48 EC do not preclude 
provisions of a Member State which generally prevent a resident parent company 
from deducting from its taxable profits losses incurred in another Member State 
by a subsidiary established in that Member State although they allow it to deduct 
losses incurred by a resident subsidiary. However, it is contrary to Articles 43 EC 
and 48 EC to prevent the resident parent company from doing so where the non-
resident subsidiary has exhausted the possibilities available in its State of 
residence of having the losses taken into account for the accounting period 
concerned by the claim for relief and also for previous accounting periods and 
where there are no possibilities for those losses to be taken into account in its 
State of residence for future periods either by the subsidiary itself or by a third 
party, in particular where the subsidiary has been sold to that third party.  
Marks & Spencer, ¶ 61 (Dec. 13, 2005). The United Kingdom has announced plans to modify 
its legislation to allow foreign losses falling within the second sentence of the court’s ruling, 
but only if the losses are not part of a tax-motivated transaction. Press Release, HM Revenue 
& Customs, Changes to Company Tax Relief Following European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
Judgment (Feb. 20, 2006), available at http://www.gnn.gov.uk/Content/Detail.asp? 
ReleaseID=188162&NewsAreaID=2. 
64.   Marks & Spencer, ¶¶ 32-34 (Dec. 13, 2005). 
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of foreign subsidiaries must be available to offset the income of such parent 
companies (on the same condition). It is also easy to see how this result applies 
to Marks & Spencer, because its subsidiaries had been liquidated or sold. On 
the other hand, the court failed to provide any helpful guidance on the 
meaning of the condition under other circumstances, particularly when the 
definition of losses and the provisions for deductibility differ across member 
states. We will not be surprised to see the question of foreign loss offsets return 
to the ECJ. 
The foreign investment in Marks & Spencer through a foreign subsidiary is 
commonly called direct investment. Another form of foreign investment occurs 
when individuals in one country purchase shares in foreign companies. This is 
known as portfolio investment. The ECJ has invalidated a number of 
residence-country tax provisions that restrict outgoing investment in both 
categories, including: 
The United Kingdom did not allow U.K. holding companies to 
consolidate losses unless their business consisted wholly or mainly of 
holding shares in U.K. subsidiaries.65 
 
France permitted companies selling medical products to deduct 
research and development costs, but only if those costs were incurred in 
France.66 
 
The Netherlands taxed dividends that Dutch shareholders received 
from foreign companies but not dividends they received from Dutch 
companies.67  
 
Austria taxed dividends that Austrian shareholders received from 
foreign companies at a higher rate than dividends they received from 
Austrian companies.68 
 
Finland provided shareholder credits for corporate taxes to Finnish 
holders of shares in domestic, but not foreign, corporations.69  
 
65.  Case C-264/96, Imperial Chemical Industries plc v. Colmer, 1998 E.C.R. I-4695. 
66.  Case C-254/97, Société Baxter v. Premier Ministre, 1999 E.C.R. I-4809. 
67.  Case C-35/98, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.C.R. I-4071 
(deciding the case on the basis of a Commission directive implementing Treaty freedoms). 
68.  Case C-315/02, Lenz v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Tirol, 2004 E.C.R. I-7063. 
69.  Case C-319/02, In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477. Additional cases involve discrimination 
against outgoing investment or transfers. See, e.g., Case C-471/04, Finanzamt Offenbach am 
Main-Land v. Keller Holding GmbH (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/ 
juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-471/04”) (invalidating a German disallowance of 
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As we explain below, the last three of these decisions, which concern outgoing 
portfolio investment, helped demolish a widespread European system for 
eliminating or mitigating the double taxation of corporate income. 
ii. implications of the ecj  decisions 
A. Legal Implications 
It should be evident that the ECJ has adopted a much more robust concept 
of discrimination than that found in international tax and trade law, 
particularly with respect to outgoing investment. Indeed, a recent 
PricewaterhouseCoopers study concludes that the corporate tax systems of all 
twenty-five EU members contain provisions that violate the court’s 
jurisprudence.70 
 
financing costs for foreign, but not domestic, second-tier subsidiaries); Case C-268/03, De 
Baeck v. Belgium, 2004 E.C.R. I-5961 (invalidating a Belgian capital gains tax on shares 
transferred to foreign, but not domestic, buyers); Case C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant v. 
Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2409 (invalidating a 
French tax on the transfer of stock abroad); Case C-168/01, Bosal Holding BV v. 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2003 E.C.R. I-9409 (invalidating a Dutch deduction for 
financing costs for domestic subsidiaries, but not for foreign subsidiaries unless they 
produced income in Holland); Case C-436/00, X v. Riksskatteverket, 2002 E.C.R. I-10,829 
(invalidating a provision under which transfer of shares to foreign companies or companies 
with foreign parents for less than market value was taxable to Swedish shareholders when 
the transfer to Swedish companies without foreign parents was not); Case C-141/99, 
Algemene Maatschappij voor Investering en Dienstverlening NV (AMID) v. Belgium, 2000 
E.C.R. I-11,619 (holding that Belgian operating losses could not be carried forward against 
Belgian income if those losses could have been offset against income of a foreign affiliate 
exempt under a tax treaty); Case C-251/98, Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst 
Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem, 2000 E.C.R. I-2787 (invalidating a Dutch 
exemption from wealth tax for shares in domestic, but not foreign, companies); Case C-
200/98, X AB v. Riksskatteverket, 1999 E.C.R. I-8261 (invalidating a provision granting 
Swedish tax relief for transfers within corporate groups but not for transfer to a Swedish 
subsidiary partially owned by a controlled foreign company). 
70.  Press Release, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers Study Shows All 25 
EU Countries’ Tax Systems To Be in Breach of EU Law (Oct. 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/content/detail.asp?ReleaseID=1026&NewsAreaID=2. 
For an earlier analysis, see European Union: Fundamental Freedoms for Citizens, Fundamental 
Restrictions on National Tax Law, 40 EUR. TAX’N (SPECIAL ISSUE) 3 (2000) (identifying 
provisions of national law that are arguably contrary to ECJ jurisprudence).  
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Member state victories in corporate tax cases have been rare.71 In principle, 
provisions that violate EC Treaty freedoms can be justified on certain grounds, 
such as the internal consistency of the member state’s tax system (usually 
styled “cohesion” or “coherence” in ECJ opinions) and the prevention of tax 
avoidance. In the past, however, the court has rarely upheld provisions on 
these grounds, often stating that less intrusive means to such ends should be 
available (the principle of proportionality).72 The ECJ also regularly rejects 
arguments by member states based on loss of revenue and erosion of the tax 
base,73 although at least one recent advocate general’s opinion suggests that 
financial consequences may be relevant.74 
A robust prohibition of discrimination against commerce among member 
states may sound innocuous or even benign, given the goal of creating a single 
internal market in the EU. However, a requirement of nondiscrimination is too 
unidimensional an approach for many issues of income tax design. The ECJ 
decisions to date suggest potentially staggering constraints on countries’ 
freedom to resolve what strike us as quintessentially legislative issues—
constraints that are fundamentally inconsistent with the fiscal autonomy 
retained by the member states in their right to veto EU taxing provisions. In 
this Section, we explore the legal implications of the ECJ jurisprudence both 
retrospectively and prospectively. We begin by showing how the court 
undermined a longstanding system for avoiding double taxation of corporate 
income in many EU countries. We then speculate on whether EU member 
states are still free to encourage domestic investment with tax incentives and to 
eliminate international double taxation with foreign tax credits. 
 
71.  One exception is Case 81/87, The Queen v. HM Treasury, 1988 E.C.R. 5483 (upholding the 
U.K. requirement of government consent if a U.K. company moved its business 
headquarters abroad, removing it from U.K. tax jurisdiction). 
72.  See MASON, supra note 5, at 93-114. 
73.  Id. at 110. 
74.  Case C-475/03, Banca Popolare di Cremona v. Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Cremona (Mar. 17, 
2005) (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/ 
index.htm (search for “Case C-475/03”) (considering whether a regional tax on production 
levied in Italy is compatible with the prohibition of national turnover taxes other than a 
value-added tax); see also Michael Lang, The Marks & Spencer Case—The Open Issues 
Following the ECJ’s Final Word, 46 EUR. TAX’N 54, 67 (2006) (arguing that the ECJ’s decision 
in Marks & Spencer might have been motivated by revenue considerations). 
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1. The Demise of Imputation 
Until recently, many countries in the EU avoided double taxation of 
corporate income (once to the corporation and again to shareholders on receipt 
of a dividend) by providing a full or partial shareholder credit for corporate 
taxes previously paid with respect to income distributed as a dividend.75 Full 
implementation of such a credit would result in corporate income ultimately 
being taxed only once, at the shareholder’s tax rate, so the income is said to be 
imputed to shareholders.76 
The other major policy option for integrating corporate and shareholder 
taxes is a full or partial shareholder exclusion of dividends.77 Full 
implementation of an exclusion would result in corporate income ultimately 
 
75.  For further discussion of the issues involved in designing an integrated tax system, see U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: 
TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., AM. LAW INST., 
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES, REPORTER’S STUDY OF 
CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (1993); and Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., 
Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767 
(1999). The foregoing are collected in INTEGRATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE AND 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
REPORTS (Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr. eds., 1998) [hereinafter TREASURY AND 
ALI INTEGRATION REPORTS]. 
76.  Consider a corporation that earns $200, pays $60 in corporate taxes at a rate of 30%, and 
distributes half of the remaining $140 each to shareholders A and B, whose tax rates are 25% 
and 35%. As shown in the table below, full imputation converts the corporate tax into a 
withholding tax, with each shareholder ultimately receiving the same after-tax return he 
would have received if his share of the corporate income had been taxed at his individual tax 
rate: 
shareholders a(25%)  b(35%) 
1. Shareholder cash dividend $70  $70  
2. Shareholder taxable income $100  $100  
3. Preliminary shareholder tax $25  $35 
4. Tax credit  ($30)  ($30) 
5. Final shareholder tax (3-4) ($5)  $5 
6. Net shareholder cash (1-5) $75  $65 
To avoid confusion, it is worth noting that an imputation shareholder credit is entirely 
distinct from the foreign tax credit discussed above. The former is aimed at reducing double 
taxation of corporate income (often called economic double taxation) that can occur in a 
single country, whereas the latter is aimed at reducing international double taxation (that 
involves taxation by more than one country). The two forms of multiple taxation converge 
when a corporation is taxed in one country and its shareholders in another. 
77.  A third option, deduction of dividends, is usually rejected because it would automatically 
extend the benefits of integration to exempt and foreign shareholders. See TREASURY AND 
ALI INTEGRATION REPORTS, supra note 75, at 251-53, 641. 
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being taxed only once, at the corporate tax rate. Largely as a result of the ECJ 
tax decisions, the shareholder credit option has now been abandoned in the 
EU,78 in some cases even before the ECJ had decided whether it violated the EC 
Treaty freedoms. In order to understand this development, we need to explain 
two potential complications of imputation systems. 
First, untaxed corporate income complicates imputation because a 
shareholder credit assumes that the corporation has paid the taxes to be 
credited on receipt of a dividend. Rather than requiring every corporation to 
report to every shareholder the amount of a varying tax credit on every 
distribution, the European approach to imputation had been to provide a 
standard credit and require the corporation to pay a compensatory tax on 
distributions if previously paid corporate taxes were less than the total amount 
of credits available to shareholders. 
Second, international income also complicates imputation for both 
incoming and outgoing investment.79 The key issue regarding incoming 
investment is whether the shareholder credit should be available to foreign 
investors. A source country typically imposes only flat-rate “withholding taxes” 
on dividends to foreign shareholders, because it has no way of knowing the rest 
of the shareholder’s income situation. The traditional practice has been to 
reduce these withholding taxes to identical low levels in bilateral tax treaties. 
Corporate income would therefore be subject to primary taxation in the source 
country (due to the exemption or foreign tax credit in the residence country), 
while dividends then paid to the foreign investors would be subject to primary 
taxation in the residence country (due to reduction of withholding taxes in the 
source country). In this situation, imputation would achieve integration for 
domestic investors, while leaving for treaty negotiation the question of whether 
shareholder credits would be extended to foreign investors. Countries have 
differed in their willingness to enter into treaties that extend credits to foreign 
shareholders. The most common decision—not to extend such credits to 
foreign investors—creates the possibility of source-country favoritism of 
domestic investors, because the corporate tax on domestic income would be 
integrated when distributed to domestic, but not foreign, shareholders. 
 
78.  See, e.g., Richard J. Vann, General Report, 88A CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 
[STUD. INT’L FISCAL L.] 21 (2003). 
79.  See PETER A. HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION AND ALLOCATING 
TAXING RIGHTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES (1996); TREASURY AND ALI INTEGRATION REPORTS, 
supra note 75, at 12-14, 183-98, 735-63; Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and 
the Division of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565 (1992); 
Hugh J. Ault, International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration, 10 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 461 
(1978). 
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Regarding outgoing investment, the key issue is whether foreign taxes paid 
on corporate income earned abroad should reduce shareholder taxes when that 
income is distributed as a dividend. The tendency has been to ignore 
corporate-level foreign taxes when computing individual shareholder taxes on 
dividends out of foreign income. Distribution of foreign income to 
shareholders could therefore trigger a compensatory tax, leading to the 
possibility of residence-country bias against investment abroad. Domestic 
corporate income is taxed only once by the residence country when distributed 
to domestic shareholders under full imputation. Foreign corporate income is 
taxed in the source country and typically benefits from either an exemption or a 
foreign tax credit in the residence country, but such income typically is taxed 
again when distributed to shareholders as a dividend. 
The potential for favoring domestic investors and domestic investment 
under imputation has long been known, and various solutions have been 
proposed in Commission studies over the years.80 The unanimity requirement, 
however, always precluded adoption of any particular solution, and member 
states began to fear that their imputation systems would be found by the ECJ 
to violate the EC Treaty freedoms. After the court held in 2000 that an 
exemption for domestic dividends had to be extended to dividends from other 
member states,81 the Commission forcefully argued that imputation also 
 
80.  See Commission Staff Working Paper, Company Taxation in the Internal Market, SEC (2001) 
1681 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/resources/ 
documents/company_tax_study_en.pdf [hereinafter Working Paper on Company Taxation] 
(finding rate differences the most important corporate tax distortion within the EU, but 
recommending harmonization of the tax base); Comm’n of the Eur. Communities, Report of 
the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation (Ruding Committee Report) 
(Mar. 1992) (recommending staged steps to reduce corporate tax distortions, including a 
minimum base and rate, as well as extension of imputation credits to foreign income); 
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Harmonization of Systems of 
Company Taxation and of Withholding Taxes on Dividends, 1975 O.J. (C 253) 2 (recommending 
a common imputation system); A.J. van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and Individual Income 
Tax in the European Communities (EEC Comm’n, Approximation of Legislation Series No. 
15, 1970) [hereinafter van den Tempel Report] (recommending a common system of 
separate corporate and individual income taxation); EEC Comm’n, The Development of a 
European Capital Market (Segré Report) (Nov. 1966), available at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter1/19661130en382develeurocap
itm_a.pdf (recommending imputation credits be extended to foreign income or foreign 
shareholders); EEC Comm’n, Fiscal and Fin. Comm., Report on Tax Harmonization in the 
Common Market (Neumark Report) (July 8, 1962), reprinted in TAX HARMONIZATION IN THE 
COMMON MARKET 7 (Commerce Clearing House, Inc. ed. & trans. 1963) (recommending a 
common system of split-rate corporate taxation under which preferential rates would apply 
to distributed earnings). 
81.  Case C-35/98, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.C.R. I-4071. 
GRAETZWARREN 4/10/2006 3:29:31 PM 
income tax discrimination 
1211 
 
violated the EC Treaty freedoms.82 Late in 2004, the ECJ eventually did strike 
down the Finnish imputation system because it failed to provide tax credits to 
Finnish shareholders for corporate taxes paid to other member states by 
companies established in those member states.83 
The major European countries had, however, already begun abandoning 
their imputation systems in anticipation of a negative decision by the ECJ. 
Legislation effective in 2001 replaced the German imputation system with a 
shareholder exclusion for half of dividends received, whether from within 
Germany or from abroad, including from countries outside the EU. While 
some policy analysts had argued for this change on the basis of the developing 
ECJ jurisprudence, others had opposed the resulting partial double taxation of 
corporate income as economically harmful to Germany.84 The United 
Kingdom had already eliminated much of its imputation system in legislation 
effective in 1999, which retained the form of a shareholder tax credit in order 
not to violate certain provisions of the U.K.-U.S. tax treaty.85 Those treaty 
provisions have since been eliminated, so some observers now anticipate a 
more transparent version of the U.K. legislation that will eliminate the 
shareholder credit even as a matter of form.86 Finally, France and Italy both 
adopted legislation in 2003 that replaced their imputation systems with a 
partial shareholder exclusion for dividends.87 As of this writing, only a few of 
 
82.  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, Dividend Taxation of Individuals in the Internal Market, COM 
(2003) 810 final (Dec. 19, 2003). 
83.  Case C-319/02, In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477; see also Case E-1/04, Fokus Bank ASA v. 
Norway, [2005] 1 C.M.L.R. 10 (Eur. Free Trade Area Ct. Nov. 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.dinesider.no/customer/770660/archive/files/Decided%20Cases/2004/e_1_04de
cision-e.pdf (holding that Norway’s failure to grant imputation credits to German and U.K. 
shareholders of a Norwegian company violated the free movement of capital provisions of 
the European Economic Area Agreement, which extends certain aspects of the EU internal 
market to Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). 
84.  See Klaus Eicker, EC Tax Scene: Germany Introduces a ‘Classical’ System of Corporate Taxation 
in Order To Meet European Requirements, 28 INTERTAX 453 (2000); Stephan Eilers & Holger 
Häuselmann, German Tax Reform 2001, DERIVATIVES REP., Oct. 2000, at 1; Dieter Endres & 
Andreas Oestreicher, 2001 Tax Reform in Germany—Planning for a New Era, 28 INTERTAX 
408 (2000); Klaus Sieker, The German Reduction Tax Act 2001, 30 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 115 
(2001). 
85.  See Malcolm Gammie, UK Imputation, Past, Present and Future, 52 BULL. INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 429 (1998). 
86.  See Vann, supra note 78, at 50. 
87.  Eric Berengier, France Amends Treatment of Dividend Distributions, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 467 
(2005); Gianluca Queiroli, Italy’s Dividends Tax Treatment: A Chance of Harmonization, 35 
TAX NOTES INT’L 535 (2004). 
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the EU member states still have imputation systems; most have adopted some 
form of dividend exclusion.88 
The demise of the European imputation systems would have been 
remarkable enough if it had followed an unequivocal ECJ decision reflecting 
agreement that discrimination against international commerce was an inherent 
feature of such systems. However, many member states repealed longstanding 
legislation even before a final ECJ decision. Moreover, the Advocate General 
eventually indicated in In re Manninen that imputation might well conform 
with the treaty freedoms if certain modifications were made.89 
We do not argue here that shareholder credits are necessarily superior to 
shareholder exclusions as a means of eliminating the double taxation of 
corporate income.90 The choice turns largely on the tradeoff between 
progressivity and simplicity. A credit would apply the shareholder’s marginal 
tax rate to corporate-source income, while an exclusion would avoid many of 
the complexities of imputation. That choice seems to us quintessentially 
legislative. Our point is that making nondiscrimination the sole criterion for 
the choice necessarily suppresses considerations of efficiency, fairness, and 
administrability that should inform difficult tax policy decisions. Nor do we 
deny the possibility that some countries might have used the specter of ECJ 
action as cover for repealing imputation for other reasons; even that possibility 
would demonstrate the reach of the court’s jurisprudence. 
2. The Future of Tax Incentives and International Double Taxation 
Is the demise of imputation the harbinger of other profound consequences 
for member state business tax laws? We address this question by speculating 
on the potential effects of the ECJ decisions on two other typical features of 
corporate taxation: stimulation of domestic investment and elimination of 
international double taxation. 
 
88.  Austria, Malta, Spain, and the United Kingdom retain some version of imputation. 
EUROPEAN TAX HANDBOOK 2005, at 56, 464, 613, 725 (Juhani Kesti ed., 16th ed. 2005). In 
2003, the United States extended the preferential tax rate on capital gains to dividends, 
which has the same effect as a partial exclusion. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (West Supp. 2005). 
89.  Case C-319/02, In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477, ¶ 80 (Mar. 18, 2004) (opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott). For a recent discussion of methods to reduce bias against 
international investment in the context of the Australian imputation system, see C. John 
Taylor, Alternative Treatments for Foreign Source Income in Australia’s Dividend Imputation 
System, 20 AUSTL. TAX F. 189 (2005). 
90.  In previous work relating to the U.S. corporate tax, one of us has favored credits, while the 
other has favored exclusions. See TREASURY AND ALI INTEGRATION REPORTS, supra note 75, 
at 7-8, 77-96, 637-90. 
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Inspired by the success of Silicon Valley, France recently announced the 
creation of sixty-seven pôles de compétitivité, regional sites where public and 
private research efforts would be combined to achieve excellence in a particular 
business domain.91 The French government promised support of at least ¤1.5 
billion over three years, including reductions in corporate taxation and social 
security contributions for participants. 
Are the contemplated tax reductions for these sites, all of which are in 
France, consistent with the ECJ case law? In addition to the decisions noted 
above, consider that the court recently struck down French legislation limiting 
a research tax credit to research conducted in France.92 As for the Commission, 
it has indicated that Europe needs additional spending for research,93 but it has 
also formally requested that Spain modify its tax deduction for research and 
development, because research outside Spain is subject to limitations that do 
not apply to research done in Spain.94 (Such formal requests are typically 
issued prior to instituting proceedings before the ECJ.) The strength of the 
Commission’s negative view regarding tax benefits that are limited to a 
member state’s territory is perhaps best illustrated by a noncorporate case it 
has filed in the ECJ seeking to invalidate a German income tax deduction for 
certain school expenses because the deduction was available only for schools in 
Germany.95 The Commission reasoned that this restriction placed the 
 
91.  Sophie Fay & François Grosrichard, 67 pôles de compétitivité pour dessiner une nouvelle France 
industrielle, LE MONDE, July 13, 2005, at 8. 
92.  Case C-39/04, Laboratoires Fournier SA v. Direction des vérifications nationales et 
internationales, 2005 E.C.R. I-2057; see also Case C-242/03, Ministre des Finances v. 
Weidert, 2004 E.C.R. I-7379 (invalidating a Luxembourg tax deduction for the foundation 
or expansion of domestic, but not foreign, corporations). 
93.  Press Release, European Comm’n, Why Europe Needs Research Spending (June 9, 2005), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/199; 
see also László Kovács, European Comm’r for Taxation and Customs, EU Tax Policy and Its 
Implications for Ireland, Speech to European Movement Ireland 12 (Feb. 24, 2006), available 
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/commission_barroso/kovacs/speeches/speech_dublin.pdf 
(“The Commission will issue a communication . . . proposing a common framework 
relating to R&D tax incentives [that] will set out the constraints of Community law and 
identify best practices.”). 
94.  Press Release, European Comm’n, Direct Taxation: Commission Requests Spain To Amend 
Laws Incompatible with the EC Treaty (July 14, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int 
/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/933. 
95.  Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Decides To Refer Germany to Court 
Concerning Tax Deductions for School Fees (July 15, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/946; see also Press 
Release, European Comm’n, Commission Refers Sweden to Court over Discriminatory 
Rules on Capital Gains Tax Relief on Home Sales (Dec. 16, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1621 (concluding that 
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provision of services by foreign schools at a disadvantage, making parents who 
would like their children to be educated in another member state worse off. 
The Commission’s position with respect to tax incentives for economic 
development is complicated by its role in enforcing treaty provisions that 
prohibit state aid to private enterprise that is incompatible with a single 
European market, while recognizing that some regional aid is appropriate.96 
Exercise of the Commission’s discretion to reconcile these positions is, of 
course, subject to the ECJ’s interpretation of the treaty freedoms.97 With 
respect to taxation, the Commission has drawn a highly problematic 
distinction between provisions that are generally applicable and those that are 
exceptions, with only the latter constituting prohibited state aid.98 Two recent 
examples of the Commission’s use of state aid authority to invalidate tax 
incentives are its current investigation of Luxembourg’s exemption for finance 
and holding companies (a benefit in effect since 1929) and its decision to 
condition preliminary approval of the pôles de compétitivité on an undertaking 
by France that corporate tax reductions would not exceed a de minimis amount 
(€100,000 per taxpayer per year).99 
 
the deferral of gain on the sale of a home violated the treaty freedoms because it was 
conditioned on the purchase of another home in Sweden). 
96.  EC Treaty art. 87; see also RAYMOND H.C. LUJA, ASSESSMENT AND RECOVERY OF TAX 
INCENTIVES IN THE EC AND THE WTO 77-80 (2003). 
97.  See, e.g., Case C-156/98, Germany v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. I-6857 (sustaining the 
Commission’s rejection of a post-unification regional tax concession in certain former 
territories of East Germany on the ground that the state aid violated the freedom of 
establishment because the aid was limited to taxpayers headquartered in the region). 
98.  Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct 
Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 384) 3, ¶ 13 (providing examples of general provisions 
including tax rates, measures to prevent double taxation or tax avoidance, and measures 
pursuing general economic policy objectives such as research and development). The 
distinction between general provisions and exceptions is based on language in Article 87 of 
the EC Treaty that prohibits state aid “favouring certain undertakings or the production of 
certain goods.” See Wolfgang Schön, Taxation and State Aid Law in the European Union, 36 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 911, 916-17 (1999) (comparing the scope of the four freedoms with 
that of the state-aid provisions). This distinction between general provisions and exceptions 
also is typically used to construct “tax expenditure” budgets, which, although published by 
many countries, remain controversial. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 41-56 (5th ed. 2005). 
99.  Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Commission Opens Formal Investigation into 
Luxembourg’s 1929 Tax-Exempt Holdings (Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://europa.eu.int/ 
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/132; Letter from Neelie Kroes, European 
Comm’n, to Michel Barnier, Foreign Minister, France ¶¶ 14, 32 (Jan. 19, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/state_aids/comp-2004/n407-04.pdf 
(regarding the “[r]égime d’aide que la France envisage de mettre à exécution en faveur des projets 
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We offer no opinion on whether corporate tax incentives like those for the 
French pôles de compétitivité will eventually pass muster under either the state-
aid provisions or the treaty freedoms, but we think it is fair to conclude that the 
tax advantages involved are fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of the 
ECJ decisions that have invalidated tax provisions favoring domestic 
production. Indeed, we believe that member states may eventually find that 
their freedom to use a variety of tax measures to stimulate domestic economic 
development has been severely constrained by that jurisprudence. 
We indicated earlier that there are two standard residence-country methods 
for reducing international double taxation in national laws and the bilateral tax 
treaties: exemption of foreign income and a foreign tax credit. Just as the ECJ 
decisions undermined the shareholder credit option for reducing economic 
double taxation of corporate income, some leading European analysts now 
argue that those decisions will also eliminate the foreign tax credit option for 
reducing international double taxation. We consider an indirect and a direct 
version of this argument. 
As indicated in our discussion of Marks & Spencer, residence countries that 
have elected the foreign tax credit option do not generally tax the income of 
foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations until it is repatriated as a 
dividend to the parent company. This deferral feature of international taxation 
creates a possibility for tax avoidance because earnings can be left to compound 
abroad in a safe investment in a low- or zero-tax jurisdiction. In response, 
many countries have adopted “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) 
provisions that mandate current taxation to parent companies of passive 
investment income earned by foreign subsidiaries.100 Parent companies are not 
generally taxed on undistributed earnings of domestic subsidiaries, so the ECJ 
has been asked to invalidate CFC regimes because they apply only to foreign 
subsidiaries.101 Given the importance of these anti-avoidance provisions, the 
litigation has attracted widespread attention in Europe.102 If the CFC 
 
de R&D dans les pôles de compétitivité”). The reductions for social security were approved 
because they fell within a limited exception for research and development. 
100.  E.g., I.R.C. subpt. F (2000). 
101.  E.g., Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue (filed Apr. 29, 
2004). 
102.  See, e.g., CFC LEGISLATION, TAX TREATIES AND EC LAW (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2004); 
Birgitta Glad, New Challenges to CFC Legislation in Norway—Developing EC Law, 34 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 843 (2004); Marjaana Helminen, Is There a Future for CFC-Regimes in the EU?, 
33 INTERTAX 117 (2005); Raymond H.C. Luja, Tax Treaties and State Aid: Some Thoughts, 44 
EUR. TAX’N 234 (2004); Anders Rubinstein & Nikolaj Bjornholm, News Analysis: Do the 
Lenz and Manninen Decisions Invalidate Danish Dividend and CFC Taxation?, 36 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 286 (2004). 
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provisions are invalidated, some analysts argue that a foreign tax credit regime 
cannot be maintained because taxation of foreign income will be undermined 
by indefinite deferral.103 
A more direct form of the argument that the foreign tax credit method of 
reducing international double taxation is incompatible with the treaty 
freedoms is that it prevents a company resident in a high-tax country from 
benefiting from low taxes abroad.104 This result is arguably the logical 
extension of the taxpayer’s position in Marks & Spencer that a residence country 
cannot interfere with its companies’ freedom to invest abroad.105 
There is, however, a fundamental problem with this argument. Consider 
commerce between a high-tax country (High) and a low-tax country (Low), 
each with one company that engages only in domestic commerce (Hd and Ld) 
and one company that engages only in commerce in the foreign country (Hf 
and Lf). As shown in the following matrix, nondiscrimination against foreign 
producers and foreign production (or capital import and capital export 
neutrality) in this simple example requires equivalent treatment of two 
companies in each country. 
Figure 1. 
equality of tax treatment 
 high low 
Nondiscrimination Against Foreign 
Producers Requires 
Hd = Lf Ld = Hf 
Nondiscrimination Against Foreign 
Production Requires 
Hd = Hf  Ld = Lf 
 
Given the overlap of source and residence jurisdiction, there are three 
companies potentially subject to taxation in each country: Hd, Hf, and Lf in 
High; Ld, Lf, and Hf in Low. As long as the two countries have different tax 
 
103.  E.g., Malcolm Gammie, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Development of Direct 
Taxation in the European Union, 57 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 86, 96 (2003). 
104.  See Peter J. Wattel, Home Neutrality in an Internal Market, 36 EUR. TAX’N 159 (1996) 
(arguing that the foreign tax credit is inconsistent with the idea of a common market). But 
see Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793 
(refusing to invalidate a foreign tax credit limitation in a French-German tax treaty, as 
applied to labor income of frontier workers). 
105.  Lee A. Sheppard, Responding to Marks & Spencer, or Not, 104 TAX NOTES 1489, 1490-92 
(2004) (reporting comments of Malcolm Gammie). 
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rates and bases, however, there is no way to achieve the specified equality of tax 
results. Consider the purely domestic companies Hd and Ld. As shown in the 
matrix, each must bear the same burden as Lf and Hf, which means that Hd and 
Ld must also bear the same tax burden, implying equal taxes in both High and 
Low, which is impossible. 
This result is often expressed as the impossibility of implementing both 
capital export and import neutrality. One of us has previously made this point 
in terms of an irreconcilable conflict between three simple principles in the 
context of U.S. taxation of international transactions: 
Principle 1: People should pay equal taxes on their income regardless of 
the country that is the source of that income. In particular, U.S. 
taxpayers should be treated equally regardless of the source of their 
income. 
Principle 2: All investments in the United States should face the same 
burden regardless of whether a U.S. person or a foreign person makes 
the investment. In other words, U.S. and foreign-owned investments 
and businesses should be treated equally. 
Principle 3: Sovereign countries should be free to set their own tax rates 
and to vary them as their domestic economic situations demand.106 
The essential difficulty is that the first two principles can hold simultaneously 
in two or more countries only if income is taxed identically (for example with 
the same rates and bases) in all such countries, which would rule out the third 
principle. 
The conflicts underlying this impossibility result can produce irreconcilable 
claims of discrimination. Consider the case of Hf when High reduces 
international double taxation with a foreign tax credit. Unlike Ld, Hf will pay 
high taxes to High on its income in Low in order to achieve parity with Hd. As 
indicated above, Hf can describe its situation in terms of discrimination against 
international commerce by observing that it pays higher taxes than Ld solely 
because it is engaged in international commerce, whereas Ld is engaged in 
domestic commerce. On this view, the ECJ jurisprudence arguably requires 
High to replace its foreign tax credit with an exemption for foreign income in 
order to allow Hf to compete in Low on the same basis as Ld.107 Carried to its 
logical extreme, this view of nondiscrimination would fully implement capital 
 
106.  Graetz, supra note 34, at 272 n.36. 
107.  See Wattel, supra note 104. 
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import neutrality by permitting only source-country taxation and eliminating 
residence-country jurisdiction over international income within the EU.108 
On the other hand, a conceptually parallel argument could be made on 
behalf of Lf, which, unlike Ld, is forced to pay high taxes to High in spite of its 
legal status as a Low company.109 The idea here would be that High should not 
be able to interfere with a Low company’s choice between domestic and foreign 
production by imposing high taxes on Lf when it engages in commerce outside 
its home country. On this view, companies would carry their home-country tax 
status and rates with them wherever they operated in the EU. Such a result 
would be consistent with ECJ decisions such as Cassis de Dijon requiring 
member states to accept products that satisfy a regulatory requirement in the 
exporting, but not the importing, member state.110 As for the Commission, this 
approach would be consistent with its proposed experiment in “home state 
taxation,” which will permit some smaller companies to compute their EU 
taxable income under the tax laws of their country of origin beginning in 
2007.111 This approach would also be consistent with the Commission’s 
proposal that a service provider generally be subject to regulation only in its 
 
108.  See, e.g., JIMÉNEZ, supra note 40, at 283 (concluding that only source-country taxation is 
consistent with the Treaty freedoms). 
109.  See Ian Roxan, Assuring Real Freedom of Movement in EU Direct Taxation, 63 MOD. L. REV. 
831, 873 (2000) (suggesting that freedom of movement would, if anything, give preference 
to residence taxation); see also Cordewener et al., supra note 42, at 224-26 (suggesting that an 
exemption may be invalid because it would preclude the deduction of foreign losses); 
Howard M. Liebman & Olivier Rousselle, Discriminatory Treatment of Dividends in the 
European Union: Is the End Near?, 39 TAX NOTES INT’L 143 (2005) (explaining that a foreign 
tax credit is required for foreign withholding taxes to ensure that total taxes on incoming 
dividends are not higher than taxes on domestic dividends); Luja, supra note 102, at 235 
(suggesting that the exemption may be invalid as a form of state aid if it is only made 
available under a tax treaty). 
110.  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 
649; see also Case C-250/95, Futura Participations SA v. Administration des contributions, 
1997 E.C.R. I-2471 (citing Cassis de Dijon and holding that subjecting non-Luxembourg 
companies operating in Luxembourg to the same accounting requirements as Luxembourg 
companies was unduly burdensome and violated the Treaty freedoms); Case 8/74, 
Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837. 
111.  Commission Non-Paper to Informal Ecofin Council, Home State Taxation for Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises (July 7, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/ 
resources/documents/HST_Non-Paper_EN.pdf. As presently formulated, home state 
taxation would apply the home state tax base, but not its tax rate. A company’s total EU 
income would be computed under home state legislation and then allocated to the member 
states on the basis of a formula, such as the company’s payroll in each country, with the tax 
rate of each member state then applied to its allocation. 
GRAETZWARREN 4/10/2006 3:29:31 PM 
income tax discrimination 
1219 
 
country of origin.112 Carried to its logical extreme, this view of 
nondiscrimination would fully implement capital export neutrality by 
permitting only residence-country taxation and eliminating source-country 
jurisdiction in the EU.113 
The problem with the argument that the foreign tax credit (and residence 
taxation) is discriminatory should now be apparent. There is simply no 
principled basis to prefer it over the opposite argument that exemption of 
foreign income (and source taxation) is discriminatory.114 Putting the point 
more generally, prohibiting discrimination based on destination is ultimately 
inconsistent with prohibiting discrimination based on origin. This 
indeterminacy confirms the limits of nondiscrimination as a tool for resolving 
basic issues of international taxation. The core tax policy issue here is the 
division of the tax base between source and residence countries, the resolution 
of which has depended more on compromise and practice than on any 
overarching principle.115 Regulating that division by reasoning from a principle 
of nondiscrimination ultimately produces an incoherent result. 
So far, we have considered the logical implications of the ECJ’s robust 
approach to nondiscrimination. Are there more modest approaches that the 
court might adopt that are less robust and not subject to our impossibility 
result? We will briefly consider two. 
 
112.  See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services 
in the Internal Market, COM (2004) 2 final/3 (Mar. 5, 2004). In spite of limitations on the 
country of origin principle, this proposal played a role in the campaign against the EU 
Constitution in France, where it was said that foreign service providers, symbolized by a 
Polish plumber, would work in France without having to comply with French regulations. 
113.  It has also been argued that exemption of foreign income may violate the provisions of the 
trade treaties that prohibit export subsidies. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Treating Tax Issues 
Through Trade Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1683, 1688 (2001). 
114.  Cf. Frans Vanistendael, Marché interne et souveraineté fiscale, in REGARDS CRITIQUES ET 
PERSPECTIVES SUR LE DROIT ET LA FISCALITÉ 255, 267 (Cyrille David ed., 2005) (arguing that 
the simultaneous existence of credit and exemption systems is incompatible with the single 
market mandated by the EC Treaty, but that the ECJ does not have the authority to choose 
between the two systems). 
115.  Since the 1920s, the standard compromise found in tax treaties with respect to corporate-
source income is that residence countries defer to source countries with respect to corporate 
business income by means of a foreign tax credit or an exemption for foreign income, while 
source countries defer to residence countries with respect to shareholder dividend income by 
reducing or eliminating withholding taxes on dividends paid to foreign shareholders. See 
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 
46 DUKE L.J. 1021 (1997); see also Richard M. Bird & J. Scott Wilkie, Source- vs. Residence-
Based Taxation in the European Union: The Wrong Question?, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 78 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000) (arguing that source and residence 
are not particularly useful principles for assigning tax jurisdiction). 
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Our analysis, like the court’s, has viewed the four freedoms as protecting 
taxpayers against higher taxation of transnational income than domestic 
income. A more limited approach would be to view the freedoms as only 
precluding a member state from taxing more heavily income that crosses its 
borders than income that does not.116 The key difference between these two 
approaches is that the latter would not take into account the tax situation in the 
other state. The most rigorous version of this approach would determine 
whether a taxing provision was neutral with respect to income and outgoing 
investment on the assumption that both countries had the same tax system and 
rates.117 In the conventional language of international taxation, member states 
would be required only to apply capital import neutrality to incoming 
investment and capital export neutrality to outgoing investment. Taxing 
foreign producers at a higher rate than domestic producers would be 
prohibited on this view, as would be an investment tax credit or other tax 
benefit available for domestic, but not foreign, production. However, 
distortions resulting from the interaction of national tax systems would not be 
eliminated, because one member state’s action would be tested without regard 
to the tax situation in another member state. 
While it might have been possible to argue for such an approach in the 
past, the ECJ decisions discussed above indicate that the court does not 
consider itself subject to any such limitations today, if it ever did.118 Consider 
 
116.  See Roxan, supra note 109 (proposing a cross-migration framework for identifying 
prohibited taxation of transborder income); Wolfgang Schön, Tax Competition in Europe—
the Legal Perspective, 9 EC TAX REV. 90, 97-99 (2000) (arguing that the EC Treaty requires 
only that a country establish capital import neutrality within its borders and “not 
unreasonably hinder” exportation of capital, whether monetary, real, or human); Servaas 
van Thiel, The Future of the Principle of Non-Discrimination in the EU: Towards a Right 
to Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and a Prohibition of Double Burdens? (Oct. 21, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
117.  van den Tempel Report, supra note 80, at 37; see also van Thiel, supra note 116, at 12 (“[T]he 
question of how to address discrimination, i.e. neutrality within one tax system, should be 
distinguished from the question how to address disparities between two tax systems . . . .”). 
Professor van Thiel criticizes our conclusion that the logic of the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
involves an impossible quest to eliminate discrimination based on both origin and 
destination of economic activity, because he sees the court’s decisions as remaining “within 
one tax system.” As we indicate in the text, that view fails to account for much of the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence.  
118.  In a recent opinion, Advocate General Geelhoed formulated the obligations of source and 
residence countries under the EC Treaty as nondiscrimination. Although he did not discuss 
the impossibility of fully eliminating discrimination based on both origin and destination, 
his interpretation of those obligations did lead him to reject or restrict some of the court’s 
prior decisions finding treaty violations. Case C-374/04, Test Claimants v. Comm’rs of 
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again the Marks & Spencer decision, in which the court held that whether 
residence-country limitations on offsets for foreign losses were discriminatory 
depended on the availability of deductions for such losses in source 
countries.119 Or consider the Manninen decision, which struck down the 
Finnish imputation system because Finland did not provide tax credits to its 
residents for corporate taxes paid to a foreign country by a foreign corporation 
that then distributed dividends to Finnish shareholders. If the foreign tax were 
ignored, the Finnish legislation would not be discriminatory, because it would 
collect the same total amount of Finnish taxes (corporate and individual) on all 
corporate income distributed as dividends in Finland, whether the paying 
corporation was domestic or foreign. The successful claim of discrimination 
required the court to consider the taxes in both countries.120 Such precedents 
have led some commentators to suggest that the ECJ decisions may now 
require member states to eliminate double taxation within the EU, a possibility 
that requires looking beyond the tax situation in a single country.121 
A second approach related to nondiscrimination that would stop short of 
our impossibility result might be implied from the history of the double 
taxation and nondiscrimination provisions in the bilateral tax treaties 
developed under the aegis of the OECD.122 As discussed above, the tax treaties 
conceptualize the essential problem presented by outgoing investment as 
double taxation, not discrimination. The traditional solution has been for the 
 
Inland Revenue (Feb. 23, 2006) (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed), http://www.curia. 
eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-374/04”). 
119.  Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.curia.eu.int/ 
en/content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-446/03”). 
120.  Case C-319/02, In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477. There are several other cases in which 
the ECJ has considered not only the tax law in the member state subject to litigation, but 
also the tax law in another member state. E.g., Case C-403/03, Schempp v. Finanzamt 
München V, 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 329 (July 12, 2005) (upholding German legislation 
that conditioned deductibility of maintenance payments to a former spouse on taxability in 
the spouse’s country); Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 ECJ 
CELEX LEXIS 349 (July 5, 2005) (upholding wealth tax differences due to differences in tax 
treaties); cf. Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. 
I-2793 (holding that a residence country’s limitation of foreign tax credit to the domestic tax 
rate did not violate the EC Treaty in the context of labor income). 
121.  See, e.g., Michael Lang, Double Taxation and EC Law (Oct. 21, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors); van Thiel, supra note 116. Quite apart from the four 
freedoms, Article 293 of the EC Treaty provides that member states will eliminate double 
taxation. That Article was to be eliminated in the proposed constitution. For a critical view 
of the potential elimination, see Moris Lehner, A Significant Omission in the Constitution for 
Europe?, 2005 B.T.R. 337. 
122.  We are grateful to Hugh Ault for bringing this possibility to our attention. 
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residence country to cede primary jurisdiction over business income to the 
source country through either an exemption or a foreign tax credit. Source 
countries have, arguably in return, made two concessions: First, the source 
country cannot discriminate against investment from the residence country. 
Second, under the more recent OECD and EU attempts to limit tax 
competition,123 the source country cannot favor incoming investment over 
domestic investment. The latter concession provides some discipline against 
source countries simply taxing incoming investment at lower rates, which 
could be considered inconsistent with the expectations of the residence 
countries when they ceded taxing jurisdiction. Similarly, one might argue that 
the foregoing two concessions by source countries are premised on the 
residence country not discouraging outgoing investment. 
Given the starting point of double taxation solved by exemption and credit 
systems, one could then imagine a “nondiscrimination” approach in which 
source countries (as under current tax treaty practice) agree to apply the same 
rates to incoming investment that they apply to domestic investment, while 
residence countries (if discrimination against foreign production were 
prohibited) would apply the same rates to outgoing investment that they apply 
to domestic investment. Some might characterize this solution (like the EU 
state-aid rules) as prohibiting only special tax rates that favor or penalize 
transnational investment, while allowing countries full control over their 
general tax rates. As indicated above, we think such a distinction is 
problematic.124 
While we can imagine the OECD promoting this result,125 there is little 
reason to think that the ECJ would consider the exemption and credit methods 
of avoiding double taxation as sacrosanct under the EC Treaty. Like the first 
limited approach discussed above, this solution would not in any event achieve 
locational neutrality, because there would still be different tax rates and 
different results under credit and exemption systems. Nations would retain 
some tax sovereignty because they could set rates, but they would no longer be 
 
123.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., CTR. FOR TAX POLICY & ADMIN., THE OECD’S 
PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf; Resolution of the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Meeting Within the Council of 1 
December 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 1 (Annex 1), 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/resources/documents/COC_ 
EN.pdf. Not all non-EU OECD countries have agreed to this constraint. 
124.  See supra text accompanying note 98. 
125.  The OECD is presently studying possible changes to the nondiscrimination article in its 
model tax treaty. See Bennett, supra note 30 (manuscript at 3 n.4, on file with authors). 
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able to use tax provisions (or presumably any other tool of public policy) to 
promote domestic investment. Even in the OECD context, it seems unlikely 
that countries such as the United States would be willing to abandon these 
tools. 
Political compromise is another way to avoid the impossibility result, but 
that is not the institutional role of the court. Absent some broad legislative 
solution, which seems a long way off for Europe, the particular aspects of 
member states’ tax laws that will be struck down will depend on the agenda of 
the ECJ. That agenda will in turn depend on which cases the Commission 
chooses to bring and which cases private parties consider worth the costs of 
litigation. The latter criterion suggests that the member states may well find 
themselves defending cases that are unwinnable and, at the same time, 
expensive to lose. Complete harmonization of member state tax bases and rates 
could eliminate the underlying conflicts, but such a resolution could come only 
from EU policymakers. Although the Commission is actively pursuing the 
possibility of base harmonization,126 it currently opposes the policy of rate 
harmonization urged by some member states.127 We will return to the 
possibility of base and rate harmonization below. 
B. Fiscal Policy Implications 
Not only does the ECJ’s jurisprudence have troubling legal implications, it 
also raises a series of fiscal policy implications. One pattern emerging from the 
court’s jurisprudence is that its decisions generally reduce taxes in the member 
states. Indeed, whenever the court decides a tax case brought by a private party 
(and referred to the ECJ by a national court), the best result a member state can 
achieve is to maintain the status quo. Private litigants simply will not pay the 
 
126.  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee: Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles—A Strategy for 
Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for Their EU-Wide Activities, 
COM (2001) 582 final (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Communication on Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base]; EU Summarizes November Meeting of Harmonized Tax Base Working Group, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Jan. 21, 2005, 2005 WTD 18-16 (LEXIS).  
127.  E.g., Johnathan Rickman & Charles Gnaedinger, European Commission Rebuffs French-
German Initiative To Harmonize Corporate Tax, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, May 14, 2004, 2004 
WTD 94-3 (LEXIS). There are undoubtedly some member states that are skeptical of the 
future steadfastness of the opposition to rate harmonization on the part of a Commission 
committed to reduction of economic distortions within the EU. See, e.g., Working Paper on 
Company Taxation, supra note 80 (finding that different national tax rates are the single 
most important difference between national and transnational investment, a conclusion that 
would be strengthened by the proposed harmonization of tax bases). 
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costs of litigating unless victory promises lower taxes. And while cases brought 
to the ECJ by the Commission might either raise or lower taxes, we believe 
that, to date at least, they have tended to reduce taxes.128 The ECJ has been 
quite explicit in refusing to take the revenue costs to a member state into 
account in reaching its decisions,129 although a November 2005 advocate 
general’s opinion suggests that the retroactivity of decisions might be limited 
in exceptional cases if there is a “risk of serious economic repercussions” and 
“objective, significant uncertainty” about the EU law at issue.130 
Moreover, the ECJ has routinely rejected the defense that offending 
provisions are essential to the cohesion or coherence of member states’ taxing 
statutes.131 To be sure, member states have sometimes responded with a tax-
increasing measure to offset the potential effect of an ECJ decision on their 
national treasuries. This, for example, describes some member states’ 
responses to the ECJ’s decisions that would have required them to extend their 
corporate integration benefits both to residents of other member states and to 
investments in other member states by their own residents. Likewise, 
 
128.  The exceptions are cases eliminating incentives for domestic production, unless the country 
decides to extend the incentive to foreign production. 
129.  Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. I-11,779, ¶ 
36 (“It is settled law that reduction in tax revenue does not constitute an overriding reason 
in the public interest which may justify a measure which is in principle contrary to a 
fundamental freedom.”); see also Joined Cases C-397 & C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd v. 
Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 2001 E.C.R I-1727; Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-
6161. 
130.  Press Release, Court of Justice of the Eur. Communities, Advocate General Tizzano 
Proposes that the German Tax Legislation Should Be Declared Incompatible with 
Community Law, but that the Effect of Such Incompatibility Should Be Limited in Time 
(Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://curia.eu.int/en/actu/communiques/cp05/aff/ 
cp050096en.pdf (discussing Case C-292/04, Meilicke v. Finanzamt Bonn-Innenstadt, ¶ 34 
(Nov. 10, 2005) (opinion of Advocate General Tizzano), http://curia.eu.int/en/content/ 
juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-292/04”)). Advocate General Tizzano suggested, for the 
first time, limiting the retroactivity of an ECJ decision. The case concerned dividends paid in 
1995 through 1997 under the German imputation system, which favored dividends paid by 
domestic German companies over those paid to German individuals by companies resident 
elsewhere in the EU—a scheme held invalid by the ECJ in Verkoojijen. See supra Subsection 
II.A.1. The Advocate General denied relief in Meilicke, holding that Germany was 
responsible to issue refunds only for claims filed after the date of the Verkoojijen decision. It 
remains to be seen whether the ECJ will follow Advocate General Tizzano’s opinion in this 
regard. See Alexander F. Peter, ECJ Advocate General Breaks New Ground in German Tax Case, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 8, 2005, 2005 WTD 235-3 (LEXIS). See supra note 74 for 
additional discussion of revenue considerations. 
131.  See, e.g., Case C-319/02, In re Manninen, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477; Case C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du 
Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2409. 
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Germany’s response to the ECJ’s thin-capitalization decision,132 which struck 
down Germany’s restrictions on the ability of companies to use interest 
deductions to strip taxable earnings out of Germany into lower-tax member 
states, was to extend these restrictions to domestic transactions. But specific 
responses such as these do not put the lie to the general proposition that ECJ 
decisions have tended to increase fiscal pressures on the member states. 
ECJ decisions also are limiting the ability of member states to use tax policy 
to stimulate their own domestic economies. We now know that the member 
states’ economies do not move in tandem; some enjoy boom times while others 
struggle economically.133 But, as with revenue consequences, differences in 
economic circumstances are of no consequence under the ECJ’s interpretations 
of the requirements of the treaties. One standard method for combating 
recessions, for example, is to increase depreciation allowances or to provide tax 
credits for new investments in plant and equipment. The United States often 
has used these techniques in efforts to stimulate its economy.134 Economists 
frequently have argued that providing economic stimulus this way provides 
more bang for the buck than simply reducing corporate income tax rates, 
because benefits such as these apply only to new investments, while a corporate 
rate reduction reduces the tax burden on both old and new investments.135 
Nations typically make more rapid depreciation or investment tax credits 
available only to plant and equipment used domestically since the governments 
are attempting to stimulate their domestic economies. Similarly, it is common 
for nations—including the member states of the EU—to provide special tax 
breaks for research and development conducted domestically on the grounds 
that these expenditures provide special benefits to the domestic economy and 
that they stimulate the creation of high-paying jobs. Other tax benefits, such as 
for oil and gas exploration, also are sometimes limited to domestic business 
activities for national policy reasons. 
 
132.  Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-11,779. 
133.  See, e.g., Feldstein, supra note 6. 
134.  See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 98, at 332-33, 338. 
135.  E.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory Approach, 1981 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67, 118. Some economists go further to argue that 
the biggest bang for the buck is obtained with tax incentives for machinery and equipment. 
See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long & Lawrence H. Summers, Equipment Investment and Economic 
Growth, 106 Q.J. ECON. 445 (1991) (presenting empirical evidence that economic growth is 
greater in countries that invest more heavily in equipment). But see Alan J. Auerbach et al., 
Reassessing the Social Returns to Equipment Investment, 109 Q.J. ECON. 789 (1994) (arguing 
that, over the long run, capital intensity should not matter for economic growth).  
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But, as we have shown, the ECJ has held that the EC Treaty’s promise of 
free movement of capital and free establishment—that is, of nondiscrimination 
against foreign production—may prohibit member states from taking any of 
these actions without extending equivalent benefits to foreign production 
within any other EU nation. This severely constricts the tax policy instruments 
available to member states. Extending tax breaks for investments or for 
research and development to such activities in other member states both 
increases the costs to a member state’s treasury and simultaneously dilutes the 
economic stimulus of such measures to that member state. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that no nation has agreed to this expansive concept of 
nondiscrimination in any other tax or trade treaties. 
The decisions of the ECJ, therefore, are putting significant fiscal pressure 
on the member states: They are limiting member states’ ability to structure 
their own tax systems, including their ability to respond to their own domestic 
economic conditions by benefiting domestic savings or investment. ECJ 
decisions also are restricting member states’ ability to prevent resident 
individuals or corporations from shifting assets or income to another member 
state with lower income tax rates.136 This puts downward pressure on tax 
rates—especially for mobile capital—within the EU. 
While the United Kingdom and Ireland seem to be the nations most vocal 
about the loss of control over their tax policy, this loss of fiscal flexibility 
should be of special concern for those member states that have adopted the 
Euro as their currency. These nations have explicitly ceded their control of 
monetary policy to the central European bank (which has made preventing 
inflation rather than stimulating economic growth its main concern). And they 
have pledged, through the Growth and Stability Pact, to control their 
deficits.137 But now they find their ability to fashion their own fiscal policy, by 
controlling their own income taxes, to be substantially eroded by the decisions 
of the ECJ. 
iii. the fork in the road 
This state of affairs does not seem stable. Movement may occur in either of 
two directions: toward greater harmonization of income taxes within the EU or 
 
136.  See, e.g., Wolfgang Schön, Tax Issues and Constraints on Reorganizations and Reincorporations 
in the European Union, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 197 (2004) (analyzing the legality of corporate 
exit taxes under the EC Treaty); see also supra text accompanying note 102. 
137.  The Growth and Stability Pact requires the budget deficits of member states to be below 
three percent of gross domestic product. Qualified Majority Voting, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 395 (Desmond Dinan ed., 2000). 
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toward a restructuring of the treaties and institutions of the EU to return 
greater fiscal autonomy to the member states. As Yogi Berra famously 
remarked, “When you get to a fork in the road, take it.” The ECJ has now 
brought Europe to that fork. 
A. The Path of Greater Harmonization 
In some sense, the widespread agreement that Europe now needs a 
constitution, rather than simply continuing to rely on existing treaties as its 
fundamental governing law, implies greater unification of the member states. 
But in the arena we are considering here—income taxation—the proposed 
constitution would not change the structure of governance within the EU. 
There have, however, long been forces pushing in the direction of greater 
harmonization of income taxes within Europe. The Commission, for example, 
has long maintained that harmonization of the corporate income taxes of the 
member states is essential to the full realization of the “common market” 
promised by the European treaties. As early as 1961, the Commission 
established working groups to study tax harmonization, and shortly thereafter 
it established a “Program for the Harmonization of Direct Taxes.”138 The 
essential goal was to eliminate differences in taxation that affect the movement 
of capital and to coordinate the tax policies of member states as instruments of 
economic or social policies.139 In the 1970s, the Commission pressed 
harmonization of member states’ income tax rates and tax bases even more 
vigorously, having identified a harmonized corporate income tax as a potential 
source of financing for European institutions.140 
To shorten a long story, the Commission’s goal of harmonization was 
thwarted by the Council.141 Some member states, notably France and Germany, 
have supported harmonization, and others, such as the Netherlands, have 
supported a minimum corporate income tax rate. Certain other members of the 
Council, however, have shown little interest in income tax harmonization 
measures other than those that limit opportunities for tax avoidance or 
 
138.  JIMÉNEZ, supra note 40, at 107, 109-11. 
139.  Id. at 110. 
140.  Id. at 115. 
141.  For the long story, see id. at 115-24. 
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evasion.142 Needless to say, the unanimity voting rule in the Council has 
inhibited the Commission’s ability to do more.143 
The Commission seems to have accepted that there will be no 
harmonization of corporate tax rates among the member states—at least not in 
the foreseeable future—and has shifted its efforts to the goal of harmonizing 
the corporate tax base. The Commission now justifies this effort by 
emphasizing the simplification advantages of a uniform tax base to companies 
doing business in Europe, relying less on claims of potential benefits to the 
common market. 
To some extent, this shift in argument became inevitable when the 
Commission abandoned its efforts to harmonize both the corporate income tax 
base and rates around a relatively narrow band of permissible variations. 
Corporate tax rates in the twenty-five EU countries currently extend over a 
considerable range. In 2005, Estonia had no income tax on undistributed 
corporate profits at all.144 Cyprus and Ireland had relatively low rates (10% and 
12.5% respectively), while Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
 
142.  Id. 
143.  For our purposes, it is not necessary to rehearse in great detail the Commission’s ongoing 
efforts to harmonize member states’ corporate income taxes. In 1990, the Commission 
issued a somewhat schizophrenic communication (1) urging harmonization on the ground 
that disparate member state tax systems inhibit the “development of the internal market” 
and, at the same time, (2) insisting that the member states should have the freedom to 
fashion their own tax systems except when this might cause “major distortions” in the 
operation of the internal market. Commission Communication to Parliament and the Council, 
Guidelines on Company Taxation, SEC (90) 601 final (Apr. 20, 1990); JIMÉNEZ, supra note 
40, at 127. The Commission considered the 1992 Ruding Committee Report as generally 
supportive of its 1990 conclusions. JIMÉNEZ, supra note 40, at 131-35. The Council responded 
to both the Commission and the Ruding Report in November 1992, by emphasizing the 
centrality of taxation to member state sovereignty and by treating the principle of 
“subsidiarity”—minimum EU-level action—as a foregone conclusion. Id. at 136; see also 
ANTONIO ESTELLA, THE EU PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS CRITIQUE (2002). The 
European Parliament issued its views nearly two years later. It endorsed some of the 
Commission’s conclusions, but it complicated the Commission’s task by making clear its 
belief that any changes recommended by the Commission “‘should have regard to the 
general fiscal environment linked to’” (1) “‘the establishment of the European Monetary 
Union,’” (2) member states’ “‘budget constraints,’” (3) “‘implications for other forms of 
taxation of any changes in company tax bases or rates,’” and (4) the “‘wider role of company 
taxation as an instrument of economic policy.’” JIMÉNEZ, supra note 40, at 137 (quoting the 
Cox Report, which conveyed the European Parliament’s response to the Commission). 
144.  EUROPEAN TAX HANDBOOK 2005, supra note 88, at 185. 
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Spain all had rates in excess of 30%.145 This variation in rates creates substantial 
incentives for where to locate capital within the EU. With harmonization of 
rates now off the table, it is difficult for the Commission (or anyone else) to 
contend that harmonizing the tax base will produce neutrality in corporate 
decisionmaking within Europe. Both the history and current state of corporate 
tax harmonization efforts within Europe imply that competition for capital 
investments will remain an important feature of member states’ tax policies for 
some time to come. No one versed in tax policy can comprehend the logic of 
allowing this to continue while banning all other forms of investment 
incentives, such as accelerated depreciation or tax credits. But this is precisely 
where Europe stands today. 
One cannot help but ask whether the Commission’s ongoing efforts to 
harmonize corporate tax bases is—despite its protestations—simply a stalking 
horse for a subsequent push to conform rates. The Commission’s ongoing 
complaints about the unanimity requirement and its continuing calls for 
qualified majority voting on tax matters lend credence to this view.146 But the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and certain other member states show no 
sign of any willingness to cede their veto power over taxation measures. For 
now at least, harmonization of corporate tax rates throughout Europe seems to 
be at a dead end. 
Putting aside the stalking horse view of the Commission’s effort to 
harmonize member states’ corporate tax bases but not their rates, let us 
examine what such a measure would accomplish. The Commission now 
justifies its harmonized base proposal as a method of simplifying EU corporate 
taxes and reducing the costs of tax compliance for EU companies,147 and these 
two benefits should follow. In addition, harmonization of corporate tax bases 
in a manner approved by the Commission might reduce the number of cases 
likely to come before the ECJ. Presumably a Commission-led harmonization 
effort would attempt to purge from the member states’ tax laws provisions that 
the Commission views as contravening the European treaties. As indicated 
 
145.  KMPG, CORPORATE TAX RATE SURVEY 2005, at 2-3, available at http://kpmg.com.om/ 
PDF/212792%20Global%20Tax%20Rate_fin.pdf (including effects of subnational taxes on 
corporate income). 
146.  For a description of qualified majority voting, see supra note 15. 
147.  Communication on Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, supra note 126, at 5; Communication on 
Tax Policy Priorities, supra note 17, at 6; Working Paper on Company Taxation, supra note 80, 
at 384. The European Parliament recently endorsed the idea of a common company tax base. 
European Parliament Adopts Report on Harmonized Tax Base, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 13, 
2005, 2005 WTD 239-18 (LEXIS). 
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above, a PricewaterhouseCoopers study has concluded that the corporate tax 
laws of all twenty-five member states contain such provisions.148 
The Commission would couple the harmonization of the corporate base 
with apportionment of corporate tax revenues to the member states through a 
formula similar to that used within the United States. Such formulary 
apportionment should reduce (or perhaps even eliminate) the amount of 
residence-based taxation in Europe and thereby decrease the number of cases 
involving discrimination against foreign production coming before the ECJ. 
The Commission is urging that all members must use the same formula, a 
requirement that the U.S. experience shows to be wise. Historically, the U.S. 
states used an equally weighted three-factor formula that allocated a share of 
corporate income to each state based on the amounts of property, wages, and 
sales in the state. However, many U.S. states now weigh sales more heavily in 
their formula than property or wages. Some have even adopted sales-only 
formulas that encourage companies to locate property and jobs in-state while 
taxing income from in-state sales of goods produced out of state. Thus, if the 
EU were to mimic the United States by harmonizing its corporate tax base149 
and allocating the revenues to the member states by formulary apportionment, 
the U.S. experience suggests that, without a prohibition on extra weighting of 
sales, formulary apportionment would make it easy for member states to favor 
domestic investment, something the Commission has been litigating to 
prevent.150 
In the United States, Congress has the constitutional power to impose a 
uniform formula on the states by legislation, but it has never done so.151 In the 
EU, on the other hand, short of unanimous agreement on a single formula by 
 
148.  Press Release, PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 70. 
149.  In the United States, harmonization of the tax base has occurred because the states 
piggyback on the federal corporate tax and simply use that tax base as a starting point. In 
fact, there are some relatively minor variations among the states. See 1 JEROME R. 
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ch. 7 (3d. ed. 1998 & Supp. 2005). 
150.  For further discussion of formulary apportionment, see infra text accompanying notes 200-
207. The Commission seems to be recognizing some of these difficulties. For example, in a 
December 8, 2005 speech, László Kovács, the European Commissioner for Taxation and 
Customs, emphasized that even the harmonized tax base would be optional for member 
states. László Kovács, European Comm’r for Taxation and Customs, The Future of EU 
Taxation Policy, Speech to Tax Directors’ Institute and Pricewaterhouse Coopers 5 (Dec. 8, 
2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/commission_barroso/kovacs/speeches/ 
51201TDI.pdf. 
151.  See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) (“It is clear that the legislative 
power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply 
justify the enactment of legislation requiring all states to adhere to uniform rules for the 
division of income.”). 
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all of the member states, there is no legislative body with the power to compel 
a uniform formula. While it is certainly possible for the member states to agree 
unanimously to move not only to formulary apportionment, but also to a 
specific formula, this seems unlikely any time soon. Thus, even if the 
Commission succeeded in harmonizing the corporate tax base, it might fail to 
harmonize either tax rates or the formula for allocation of profits to the 
member states. If the member states then followed our states’ example of 
fashioning formulas to provide themselves a competitive advantage, the 
Commission would likely return to the ECJ arguing that any formulas that 
favor domestic products, producers, or production violate the EC Treaty. Based 
on the ECJ decisions to date, we would expect the court to restrict member 
states’ discretion over the formula, something that both our Supreme Court 
and our Congress have refused to do. 
In sum, harmonization of member states’ tax rates is not in the cards for 
the foreseeable future. And we fail to see how—without some relatively narrow 
band of permissible variation in rates—harmonization of the corporate tax base 
coupled with formulary apportionment will accomplish the mission of 
strengthening the internal market. Indeed, based on our nation’s experience, it 
seems more likely that such a regime would simply be another way station 
along the current litigious road. Even if harmonization of tax rates could be 
achieved, it is not at all clear that the resulting uniformity would be desirable, 
given the differences in the member states’ economies and in their preferences 
regarding the size of government and the use of tax incentives for economic or 
social programs.152 
Concerned that the obstacles to harmonization now seem too great to 
overcome, the Commission has also been pursuing what it calls “soft law” 
avenues to greater coordination among member states. The Commission, for 
example, has proposed “Codes of Conduct,” which are not legally binding on 
the member states, but allow them to pledge their cooperation.153 And key 
Commission personnel have suggested that, if achieving unanimity is 
impossible, the search for “a negotiated solution adopted by consensus in a soft 
law format is the only available tool.”154 Any such consensus may involve fewer 
than the full twenty-five EU member states and, if so, would apply only to 
 
152.  See George R. Zodrow, Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 10 
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 651 (2003). 
153.  See, e.g., Kovács, supra note 150, at 6; see also Chuck Gnaedinger, EU Proposes Code of Conduct 
for Transfer Pricing Documentation, 40 TAX NOTES INT’L 688 (2005). 
154.  Michel Aujean, Dir. of Analysis & Tax Policies, EU Comm’n, Conference Presentation: The 
Future of Nondiscrimination—Direct Taxation in Community Law (Oct. 21, 2005) (on file 
with authors). 
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those who agree.155 In the meantime, the Commission fully intends to continue 
challenging member state income tax rules before the ECJ.156 
B. The Path of Greater Autonomy 
The ECJ’s tax decisions undoubtedly have produced headaches for the 
member states. As we have discussed, member states’ claims that a provision is 
necessary to maintain the coherence of their income taxes have generally been 
rejected by the court. And the court has paid little heed to the negative impact 
of its decisions on the revenues of the member states. Over time, many 
member states have abandoned their shareholder-credit systems for integrating 
their corporate and individual income taxes. The ECJ has also curtailed 
member states’ ability to provide tax incentives for domestic investment or for 
domestic research and development. ECJ decisions have also struck down (and 
threaten to strike down more) member state tax provisions designed to inhibit 
companies’ ability to shift income to lower-tax member states. The court has, 
for example, invalidated member states’ limitations on corporations’ ability to 
strip earnings from higher- to lower-tax countries within the EU. And other 
member state limitations on domestic corporations’ ability to locate income in 
lower-tax member states are in grave danger. ECJ precedents now threaten the 
extensive network of bilateral income tax treaties that has evolved since the 
1920s, both within Europe and between EU member states and other nations. 
Indeed, the foreign tax credit mechanism for relieving double taxation—used 
for more than half a century in the United Kingdom and elsewhere—now 
seems vulnerable to an adverse ECJ judgment. Even the European 
Commissioner for Taxation has conceded that he is “not happy with the fact 
that EU tax policy is increasingly being made as a result of [ECJ] decisions,” 
admitting that “recent developments in this area could lead to a situation where 
it will become almost impossible for member states to protect their tax 
bases.”157 
The likelihood, however, that the ECJ’s tax decisions, coupled with its 
other intrusions on member state sovereignty, will drive member states to 
 
155.  The EC Treaty provides for “enhanced cooperation” whenever at least eight member states 
agree. See EC Treaty art. 11; Otmar Thoemmes, A Europe à Deux Vitesses for Enterprise 
Taxation?, 32 INTERTAX 536 (2004). 
156.  Aujean, supra note 154; Kovács, supra note 150, at 12 (“One of the main tasks of the 
Commission under the EC Treaty is to ensure that member states respect their Treaty 
obligations, including, where necessary, by launching infringements proceedings against the 
Member States.”). 
157.  Kovács, supra note 150, at 13. 
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separate from the EU seems even more remote than the harmonization of 
member states’ income tax rates. The European project has come too far and 
the economic and political transformation has been too great for anyone to 
predict that Europe is about to fall apart. Member states have many reasons to 
maintain their political and economic union even if many also wish to retain 
autonomy over their tax systems, especially over income taxation. Pulling 
Europe apart is one option, but not one that the member states or the people of 
Europe seem to desire. 
On the other hand, the fiscal consequences of the ECJ’s current path are 
becoming more and more difficult for the member states to swallow. They 
simply cannot afford to stand idly by and watch their corporate tax revenues 
shrink. Nor can they readily increase their own corporate tax rates. 
Competition for capital investments within Europe blocks this avenue as a 
practical matter. (In fact, corporate tax rates in Europe and the OECD have 
been declining in recent years.158) 
One potential response by the member states to the ECJ’s erosion of their 
sovereign power to shape their own income taxes would be to restrict the 
authority of the ECJ over such matters.159 A future revision of the treaties or a 
new constitution might limit the ability of the ECJ to strike down member 
states’ income tax provisions. Such a limitation on the jurisdiction of the ECJ, 
however, would permit considerable mischief by the member states. As our 
review of the ECJ cases has shown, some member state tax provisions are 
potentially quite protectionist, and some have been adopted to serve precisely 
that purpose. The dilemma for the nations of Europe is to find a way to retain 
their autonomy over tax matters without undermining the internal market and, 
as a practical matter, severely restricting the four freedoms. 
The basic difficulty is that while the nondiscrimination requirements of 
international income tax and trade treaties may be too narrow to accomplish 
European integration, the nondiscrimination requirement that has emerged 
through the decisions of the ECJ is too broad. It stifles the member states’ 
essential ability to promote their own domestic economies. The ultimate 
question is whether there lies any viable middle ground between the limited 
nondiscrimination requirements of international tax and trade treaties and the 
unduly inhibiting version of nondiscrimination fashioned by the ECJ, which 
 
158.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 14-
15 (2005); Chris Edwards, Dir. of Tax Policy, Cato Inst., A Proposal for a Dual-Rate Income 
Tax, Testimony to the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (May 11, 2005) 
(accompanying presentation available at www.taxreformpanel.gov/meetings/docs/ 
edwards_052005.ppt). 
159.  See, e.g., Timothy Lyons, A Drive To Curb the Power of the ECJ, 2005 B.T.R. 449. 
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does not allow for compromise among inconsistent principles. One alternative 
might be a slowing of ECJ intervention with more attention to the effect on the 
member states’ fisc and a greater focus on protectionism as a potential middle 
ground. The court’s inquiry might, for example, be redirected to whether the 
intent of the provision was protectionist.160 The court also might move to 
mitigate the adverse impact of its decisions on member state revenues by 
limiting the retroactive effect of its decisions.161 
In the absence of some pullback from the ECJ’s current jurisprudence, we 
expect greater resistance by the member states. Already, several national courts 
within Europe have shown a reluctance to certify questions to the ECJ. They 
would rather interpret the requirements of European law themselves, even 
though certification is mandatory under the treaties if the governing European 
rule is unclear. The courts of Ireland, Italy, and Spain have never submitted a 
tax case to the ECJ for decision. If other member states were to follow this 
practice, they would restrict somewhat the ECJ’s power, in effect diminishing 
its jurisdiction. In addition, member states have considerable power to 
discourage their domestic companies from challenging member state tax laws 
in the ECJ. More intensive and intrusive tax audits of litigants are one 
possibility—unseemly, to be sure, but nevertheless possible. Or member states 
might respond to ECJ decisions by extending restrictions to domestic 
companies rather than eliminating the offending provisions altogether. This 
was Germany’s response after the ECJ struck down its limitations on interest 
deductions for payments to thinly capitalized foreign corporations.162 Member 
states could respond similarly to the Marks & Spencer decision by restricting the 
use of certain domestic losses. Indeed, extending restrictions to intrastate 
transactions is how U.S. states have sometimes responded to adverse U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions.163 
 
160.  Cf. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme 
Court should be concerned only with preventing purposeful protectionism in applying the 
dormant Commerce Clause). 
161.  A step in this direction has been suggested by the opinion of the Advocate General in 
Meilicke. Case C-292/04, Meilicke v. Finanzamt Bonn-Innenstadt (Nov. 10, 2005) (opinion 
of Advocate General Tizzano), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search 
for “Case C-292/04”). The ECJ may also curb the revenue impact of its holdings by 
narrowing their scope. See Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. Halsey (Dec. 13, 2005), 
http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-446/03”); see also 
supra notes 74, 130, 134 and accompanying text. 
162.  See supra notes 54-55, 132 and accompanying text. 
163.  Susannah Camic, State Responses to Adverse Supreme Court Tax Decisions (May 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
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Alternatively, the Council and Parliament might limit the Commission’s 
ability to bring cases either directly by reducing its mandate or indirectly by 
restricting its finances or increasing its workload (but not its personnel) in the 
tax arena. When the United Kingdom assumed the revolving presidency of the 
Council in 2005, the press indicated that curbs on the ECJ’s tax jurisdiction 
would be on the agenda.164 
Another possibility would be greater restraint by the ECJ itself. The court 
might, for example, give greater weight to arguments based on the fiscal 
coherence of a member state’s tax system.165 There are signals that the court 
could be moving to a more cautious mode. One advocate general, for example, 
has suggested that revenue implications might be germane to the court when 
deciding whether to strike down tax legislation.166 Another has suggested 
limiting the retroactive effect of court decisions.167 And the court itself declined 
to hold that the benefits of an intra-European tax treaty must be extended to 
nationals of member states not a party to the treaty.168 One knowledgeable 
European commentator has criticized this decision as a sign that the court may 
be softening its approach to European integration.169 Alternatively, the court 
might fashion a less robust nondiscrimination requirement.170 
 
164.  Chris Giles, UK Seeks To Curb European Tax Rules, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at 1. 
165.  Compare Case C-204/90, Bachmann v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-249 (holding that the denial 
of a deduction to Belgian purchasers of foreign insurance was justified because proceeds 
would not be taxed in Belgium), with Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe 
Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R. I-2493 (holding that the denial of a deduction by the Netherlands 
for pension contributions by a nonresident was not justified even though receipts from the 
pension plan would not be taxable under the Netherlands-Belgium tax treaty). See generally 
Marks & Spencer (Dec. 13, 2005); MASON, supra note 5, at 94-101 (discussing the scope of 
fiscal cohesion). 
166.  Case C-475/03, Banca Popolare di Cremona v. Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Cremona (Mar. 17, 
2005) (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/ 
index.htm (search for “Case C-475/03”). 
167.  Case C-292/04, Meilicke v. Finanzamt Bonn-Innenstadt (Nov. 10, 2005) (opinion of 
Advocate General Tizzano), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for 
“Case C-292/04”); see also Case C-374/04, Test Claimants v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue 
(Feb. 23, 2006) (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/ 
content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-374/04”) (criticizing the court’s decisions in 
Bosal Holding and Marks & Spencer). 
168.  Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 349 (July 
5, 2005). 
169.  Servaas van Thiel, A Slip of the European Court in the D Case (C-376/03): Denial of the Most-
Favoured-Nation Treatment Because of Absence of Similarity?, 33 INTERTAX 454 (2005). 
170.  For two possibilities, see, for example, text accompanying notes 116-125. 
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Finally, the member states may simply divide, as they did with respect to 
monetary union, with some pursuing greater harmonization, while others 
insist on greater autonomy.171 These possible responses illustrate the potential 
for member states to maintain their separatism in the face of ECJ decisions 
without pulling the EU apart. Essentially, this is a form of “muddling 
through.”172 
iv. the united states:  similarities and differences 
A. Comparable Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Europeans may be tempted to look to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the hopes of finding a way through Europe’s conundrum. After all, the U.S. 
Supreme Court since the nineteenth century has decided many cases analogous 
to the ECJ cases we discuss here. The two U.S. constitutional provisions that 
explicitly address the taxing powers of the states—the Import-Export Clause173 
and the Duty of Tonnage provision174—have not been important, but three 
other provisions have frequently been invoked: the Commerce Clause,175 the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause,176 and the Equal Protection Clause.177 Most 
of the cases have been decided under the Commerce Clause, and the Supreme 
Court explicitly requires that a state taxing provision must not “discriminate 
against interstate commerce” in order to be upheld under that Clause.178 It 
 
171.  Thoemmes, supra note 155, at 536 (observing that a “coalition of the willing” for greater 
harmonization could be formed under the “[e]nhanced [c]ooperation” provisions of the EC 
Treaty, which requires agreement of eight member states). 
172.  Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959). 
173.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . .”). 
174.  Id. cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage . . . .”). 
175.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
176.  Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
177.  Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
also been important in state tax cases involving issues of jurisdiction to tax and 
extraterritorial taxation, but it is not germane to issues of nondiscrimination. 
178.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). The other three 
requirements to satisfy the Complete Auto test are that (1) the activity taxed has a substantial 
nexus with the taxing state; (2) the tax is fairly apportioned to reflect the degree of activity 
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therefore seems worthwhile to inquire whether the ECJ might benefit from the 
U.S. jurisprudence. Implementing a coherent nondiscrimination requirement, 
however, has not proved to be any easier for the U.S. courts. 
Walter Hellerstein, the leading legal analyst of the U.S. decisions, claims 
correctly that it is futile to attempt to reconcile the Supreme Court’s “hundreds 
of decisions delineating the scope of state tax power over interstate 
business,”179 and we shall certainly not undertake that task here. Professor 
Hellerstein describes the incoherence of these decisions: 
[1] Two taxes that have a substantially similar impact on interstate 
commerce are accorded different constitutional treatment. [2] The 
Court, conceding that the “line is sometimes difficult to define with 
distinctness,” nevertheless draws one that is discernable, if at all, only 
to itself. [3] The line drawn is then explained in terms that effectively 
assure the Court ample discretion to draw lines in the future as it deems 
appropriate, without providing any clear guidance whether a particular 
levy will fall on one side or the other.180 
It would be foolhardy, therefore, for Europeans to expect the U.S. Supreme 
Court to supply a way out of the mire, even if our political arrangements were 
similar, which they are not. Most importantly, the United States employs a 
federal corporate income tax that supplies both a uniform national corporate 
tax base and a minimum national tax rate.181 The United States also has 
relatively low state corporate tax rates,182 a more unified national economy than 
the EU, and a federal legislature that can both overturn Supreme Court 
judgments and enact legislation limiting the Court’s power to nullify state 
 
that occurs within the taxing state; and (3) the tax is fairly related to benefits provided by 
the state. Id. 
179.  Walter Hellerstein, The U.S. Supreme Court’s State Tax Jurisprudence: A Template For 
Comparison 11 (Oct. 21, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
Hellerstein, State Tax Jurisprudence]; see also Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” 
Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 138 (1988) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Internal Consistency]; Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. 
Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 789 (1996). 
180.  Hellerstein, State Tax Jurisprudence, supra note 179, at 10 (quoting In re State Tax on Ry. 
Gross Receipts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 284, 296 (1872)). 
181.  See supra note 149. 
182.  Additionally, the fact that state corporate income taxes are deductible in determining federal 
taxable income typically reduces their financial impact by about one-third. See I.R.C. § 164 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2005). 
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taxes.183 Notwithstanding these critical differences, however, we shall look 
briefly at a handful of Supreme Court decisions, employing once again the 
analytical framework we used above for classifying the corporate tax decisions 
of the ECJ. As before, we begin with discrimination against out-of-state 
products (and services). 
The Supreme Court has consistently struck down laws that discriminate 
against out-of-state products. According to the Court, the “paradigmatic 
example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective 
tariff or customs duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does 
not tax similar products produced in State.”184 Because the Court has 
frequently taken such a firm position against these taxes, states have adopted 
them with decreasing frequency, so the Court, at least in recent years, has 
rarely found itself in a position to invalidate them. One such decision struck 
down state sales tax exemptions in Hawaii for two kinds of locally produced 
liquors, where these exemptions were intended to encourage the growth of the 
infant industries that produced the liquors.185 Similarly, the Court found an 
Ohio tax credit against the state’s motor vehicle fuel sales tax to be 
discriminatory.186 Under that provision, taxpayers could receive a credit for 
ethanol sold (as a component of gasohol) by fuel dealers, but only if the 
ethanol was produced either in Ohio or in a state that granted tax advantages 
similar to those granted to ethanol produced in Ohio.187 
The Court has also invalidated as discriminatory tax provisions that favor 
in-state provision of services—a type of tax that states seem to enact with 
increasing frequency. For example, the Court rejected a New York law that 
 
183.  For elaboration of these distinctions, see, for example, Walter Hellerstein & Charles E. 
McLure, Jr., Lost in Translation: Contextual Considerations in Evaluating the Relevance of US 
Experience for the European Commission’s Company Taxation Proposals, 58 BULL. INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 86 (2004). 
184.  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994). 
185.  Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). As discussed earlier, the categories of 
foreign products, producers, and production can overlap. Although some commentators, 
including Hellerstein, have classified this case as a tax incentive for in-state production, 
Hellerstein, State Tax Jurisprudence, supra note 179, at 22, 29, we believe it is better 
analyzed as a barrier to out-of-state products, because the provision seems primarily aimed 
against importation of non-Hawaii products, rather than against non-Hawaii production by 
Hawaiian taxpayers. 
186.  New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). 
187.  The Court itself viewed the Ohio regime as erecting “‘an economic barrier against 
competition’ that was ‘equivalent to a rampart of customs duties.’” Limbach, 486 U.S. at 275 
(quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)). The taxes at issue in these 
cases were taxes on consumption, not income, but it is unclear whether or how that would 
affect the Court’s analysis. 
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attempted to encourage stock trading in New York by offering a fifty percent 
reduction on the stock transfer tax levied on in-state stock transactions by non-
New York residents.188 The statute also limited the total liability of any 
taxpayer to $350 for a single transaction involving a New York sale. The Court 
struck this statute down on the ground that it offered unconstitutionally 
preferential treatment to stock trading services provided in New York. 
With respect to producers, the Court has made clear that the Commerce 
Clause prevents state tax laws from discriminating against those from out of 
state. In several of these cases, states have offered exemptions from state taxes 
to in-state producers, thereby discriminating against their out-of-state 
competitors. For example, West Virginia imposed a gross receipts tax on 
manufacturing corporations engaged in the business of selling tangible 
property in the state and allowed only local manufacturers exemptions from 
the tax.189 Similarly, Washington imposed a “business and occupation” tax on 
companies for the privilege of engaging in economic activities in the state, 
including both manufacturing and wholesale sales.190 The tax included a 
“multiple activities exemption” under which local businesses involved in both 
selling and manufacturing could exempt from the manufacturing tax the 
portion of their output subject to the wholesale tax.191 The Court struck down 
this arrangement on the ground that both taxes “facially discriminated” against 
out-of-state companies attempting to do business in Washington.192 A third 
example of a case invalidating discrimination against out-of-state producers 
involved a Massachusetts tax and subsidy program under which every milk 
producer doing business within the state had to make monthly “premium 
payments” of an amount pegged to fluctuations in the national price of milk.193 
The state then distributed the monthly collections to in-state dairy farmers, 
who received shares in direct proportion to their contribution to the state’s 
total production of raw milk. While both in-state and out-of-state producers 
made payments under this program, only in-state producers received 
compensatory benefits from the fund, a net result the Court found 
discriminatory. 
 
188.  Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
189.  ARMCO v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984). 
190.  Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 232 (1987). 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. at 244, 248; see also Hellerstein, Internal Consistency, supra note 179, at 144 (noting that, if 
one assumes that every state adopts this kind of arrangement, cross-border activity gets 
taxed twice, while the taxpayer who confines its activity to a single state is taxed only once). 
193.  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court also has struck down state taxes that discriminate 
against out-of-state production, but this type of case does not occur 
frequently.194 One such example concerned a New York statute that required 
parent companies owning domestic international sales corporations (DISCs) to 
consolidate the assets and liabilities of the DISC with those of the parent 
company.195 The state provided the parent companies with a credit that 
lowered the effective tax rate on DISC income to thirty percent of the otherwise 
applicable rate. This credit applied only to gross receipts from export products 
shipped from inside New York, and, crucially, the magnitude of the credit 
depended on the percentage of business the DISC carried out in New York. 
The Court found that this law discriminated against companies producing 
outside of New York because an increase in out-of-state DISC-related 
production reduced the in-state tax benefit. Another decision along somewhat 
similar lines struck down a tax on the “first use” within the state of any natural 
gas, but allowed a variety of exclusions and credits against the tax for 
companies that had already paid a “severance” tax on the extraction of oil and 
gas within Louisiana.196 According to the Court, this tax arrangement 
discriminated against interstate commerce by encouraging companies “to 
invest in mineral exploration and development within Louisiana rather than  
. . . in other States.”197 On another occasion, the Court invalidated a North 
Carolina “intangible property tax” on the fair market value either of stock 
owned by state residents, or of stock “having a business, commercial or taxable 
situs in the State.”198 The state imposed the tax at a rate of 0.25%, but residents 
could calculate their tax liability by taking a taxable percentage deduction equal 
 
194.  This is generally due to the U.S. states’ use of formulary apportionment for allocating 
corporate taxes among the states, which reduces the role of residence taxation because the 
allocation factors generally relate to source or consumption. See infra text accompanying 
notes 200-207. There are more state cases involving this type of discrimination. E.g., R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of New York Dep’t of Finance, 667 N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 
1997) (holding that an accelerated depreciation limited to in-state property discriminates 
against interstate commerce). See generally Hellerstein, State Tax Jurisprudence, supra note 
179, at 24-28 (discussing state court precedents). Discrimination against non-U.S. source 
income under a state income tax would violate the Foreign Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Kraft 
Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (invalidating a 
dividends-received deduction for income from domestic but not foreign corporations and 
asserting that “a state’s preference for domestic commerce over foreign commerce is 
inconsistent with the Commerce Clause”). 
195.  Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984). 
196.  Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 731 (1981). 
197.  Id. at 757. 
198.  Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 327 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to the fraction of the issuing corporation’s sales, payroll, and property located 
in North Carolina—the factors that determined the amount of corporate tax 
paid to the state. The Court found that this calculation discriminated against 
companies that located their production outside of the state. 
To recapitulate, the Supreme Court has invalidated state tax laws favoring 
in-state products, producers, and production. On the other hand, its 
jurisprudence has not yet had the same reach as the decisions of the ECJ, 
particularly with respect to the third category.199 The primary reason for this, 
we think, is not found in the differences between the two courts’ approaches to 
nondiscrimination, but rather in the fact that state taxation of corporate 
“business income”200 typically occurs through formulary apportionment. 
Under this system, the states determine their corporate tax revenues by 
allocating shares of the total corporate tax base to each state depending on that 
state’s share of wages, property, and sales. Wages and property are factors of 
production, while sales relate to consumption. Three-factor formulary 
apportionment divides the state income tax base among source and 
consumption states, largely without regard to a company’s residence. 
Residence-based taxation of corporate income is thus much less important to 
the U.S. states than it is to the EU member states. It is therefore not surprising 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has been less concerned than the ECJ with 
discrimination by states against out-of-state production by their residents.201 
The great advantage of formulary apportionment is that it avoids the 
thorny problem (which haunts tax administrations throughout the world) of 
having to determine related-company transfer prices to measure each state’s 
income. But there is a rub. Economists regard formulary allocation of income 
 
199.  See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Long Shadow of History: Sovereignty, Tax 
Assignment and Judicial Decisions on Corporate Income Taxes in the US and the EU 10 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (“[T]he conflict between state tax 
sovereignty and the dormant Commerce Clause has been nowhere near as great as the 
analogous conflict in the EU.”). 
200.  Most states define business income under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes 
Act or a substantially similar statute as “income arising from transactions and activity in the 
regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business.” UNIF. DIV. INCOME TAX PURPOSES § 1(a), 
7A U.L.A. 147 (2002). “Nonbusiness income” is typically allocated to a particular state or 
states based either on the situs of the property giving rise to the income (e.g., rents from real 
property) or on the taxpayer’s commercial domicile (e.g., interest and dividends not related 
to the taxpayer’s trade or business). 
201.  The ECJ also has more difficulty limiting its decisions in this manner because of the Treaty’s 
prohibition against state aid. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99. It is worth recalling 
that the Supreme Court, unlike the ECJ, has considerable discretion regarding which cases it 
will hear. 
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taxes as essentially imposing burdens on the elements of the formula.202 The 
U.S. states have found that the wage element of the formula increases the tax 
burden on locating jobs within the state and that the property element burdens 
the location of capital within the state. Consequently, over time states have 
moved toward weighing most heavily the sales element of the formula.203 Iowa 
was the first state to eliminate completely the property and wage aspects of the 
formula and to use only sales in its formula.204 In Moorman Manufacturing Co. 
v. Bair,205 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Iowa’s 
sales-only formula for allocating corporate profits. For many years, Iowa had 
been the only state to use a sales-only formula for apportioning corporate 
income, but five additional states have now moved to a sales-only formula, and 
more than half of the states weigh sales more heavily than the property or wage 
factors.206 Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to require the 
states to adopt uniform formulas, but, so far at least, it has declined to act. 
Dissenting in Moorman, Justice Powell described his view of what was at 
stake: “Iowa’s use of a single-factor sales-apportionment formula—though 
facially neutral—operates as a tariff on goods manufactured in other States and 
as a subsidy to Iowa manufacturers selling their goods outside of Iowa.”207 
However, a majority of the Court upheld Iowa’s sales-only formula by refusing 
to accept the three-part formula as the appropriate baseline for assessing 
nondiscrimination. In other words, a sales-only formula does not favor in-state 
 
202.  E.g., Austan Goolsbee & Edward L. Maydew, Coveting Thy Neighbor’s Manufacturing: The 
Dilemma of State Income Apportionment, 75 J. PUB. ECON. 125 (2000); Charles E. McLure, Jr., 
The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 
327 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980). 
203.  Kirk J. Stark, The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Subnational Corporate Income Taxation, 23 ST. TAX 
NOTES 775, 780-82 (2002). 
204.  Id. at 780. 
205.  437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
206.  Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Oregon have adopted single-factor sales 
formulas, and about half the states have formulas that double-weigh sales in their 
apportionment formulas. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND 
LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 610-11 (8th ed. 2005); see also Stark, supra note 203, 
at 780-82. 
207.  Moorman, 437 U.S. at 283-84 (Powell, J., dissenting). We do not question Justice Powell’s 
characterization of Iowa’s sales-only formula as a subsidy to exports (when compared to the 
three-part formula), but since sales of both Iowa and out-of-state products enter equally 
into Iowa’s tax calculation, we do not agree that its formula necessarily operates as a tariff. 
See also Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Does Sales-Only Apportionment of 
Corporate Income Violate International Trade Rules?, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 779 (2002) (arguing 
that a single sales factor formula may be an illegal export subsidy under the international 
trade treaties). 
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production if one ignores other states’ three-part formulas or if one assumes 
that all states have moved to a sales-only formula. This result provides 
American states a means of favoring in-state production that does not exist in 
the EU. 
An important case currently before the Supreme Court may provide some 
insight into whether its approach to discrimination will move closer to that of 
the ECJ regarding outgoing investments. In Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc.,208 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed an abatement from local property 
taxes but invalidated an Ohio investment tax credit for new investments in 
Ohio. Both benefits were intended to encourage a company to locate a 
manufacturing facility in Ohio. The appellate court struck down the 
investment tax credit on the ground that this incentive favored in-state over 
out-of-state investment.209 Even though nearly all of the fifty states provide 
incentives for local investments, relatively few of these have been challenged, 
and the Supreme Court has not yet squarely confronted the question of their 
validity.210 If affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Cuno decision would 
invalidate a wide variety of tax incentives enacted to favor in-state investments 
and would move the United States further down the path taken by the ECJ 
with respect to this type of discrimination—and further into the labyrinth of 
impossibility we have described.211 
 
208.  386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. 
Ct. 36 (2005) (No. 04-1704). 
209.  The court stated: 
[A]s between two businesses, otherwise similarly situated and each subject to 
Ohio taxation, the business that chooses to expand its local presence will enjoy a 
reduced tax burden, based directly on its new in-state investment, while a 
competitor that invests out-of-state will face a comparatively higher tax burden 
because it will be ineligible for any credit against its Ohio tax. 
Cuno, 386 F.3d at 743. 
210.  One analyst claims that forty-six states offer more than 330 statutory income or franchise tax 
credits. Timothy H. Gillis, Sixth Circuit Bans Ohio Tax Credit Under the Commerce Clause, 
Casting a Pall on Incentives, 101 J. TAX’N 359, 360 (2004). Another survey of forty-eight states 
found that only Wyoming had not enacted at least one location incentive between 1991 and 
1993. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State 
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 383-84 (1996); see also Chris Micheli, A 50-
State Comparison of Tax Incentives for Manufacturing Equipment Purchases, 12 ST. TAX NOTES 
1739 (1997) (explaining that nearly all states provide tax and other economic incentives for 
local economic activity). 
211.  The Supreme Court may refuse to reach the merits in this case on the ground that Cuno and 
the other plaintiffs lack standing. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 36, 36 
(2005) (granting certiorari and directing the parties to brief the question of “[w]hether 
respondents have standing to challenge Ohio’s investment tax credit”).  
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While some, including Professor Hellerstein,212 have argued that Cuno can 
readily be distinguished from Moorman, we disagree. The Ohio investment 
credit is simply a less expensive method of favoring in-state over out-of-state 
investments.213 Rather than using a sales-only formula to avoid taxing any 
property located in the state, the credit is directed only at new investments. 
While it is not our main subject here, we think the U.S. Supreme Court should 
uphold Ohio’s investment credit incentive and avoid stepping further into the 
conundrum that exists under the ECJ’s decisions.214 In taking this position, 
however, we should make clear that we need not endorse local tax incentives to 
do so. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to determine the extent 
to which such incentives should be allowed. Legislation has been introduced in 
Congress that would permit investment tax credits of the sort struck down by 
the Sixth Circuit in Cuno and would generally authorize states to provide tax 
incentives that otherwise might be held to be unconstitutionally 
discriminatory.215 These bills also attempt not to overturn the remainder of the 
Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence—admittedly a difficult 
task.216 But Congress, not the Court, is the most appropriate body to decide 
whether to permit states to provide incentives for local investments, and if 
Congress speaks, it will almost certainly respond affirmatively. 
B. Implications of the ECJ Decisions for the United States 
We began our discussion of the Supreme Court decisions in the previous 
Section by asking if they could help resolve the conundrum created by the ECJ. 
Let us now turn the question around and ask what, if anything, the 
 
212.  Hellerstein, State Tax Jurisprudence, supra note 179, at 29-34. 
213.  Another example would be states’ piggybacking on the domestic manufacturing provision of 
§ 199 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 199 (West Supp. 2005). 
214.  A further reason to avoid striking down Ohio’s investment tax credit is the fact that direct 
subsidies to encourage in-state production have been permitted by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler: 
A Critique, 34 ST. TAX NOTES 37 (2004); Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the 
Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on 
Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29 (2002). Europe does not have the same 
discontinuity between tax incentives and direct expenditures because of the Treaty’s 
prohibitions against state aid. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99. 
215.  H.R. 2471, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1066, 109th Cong. (2005). These bills are identical. 
216.  See Walter Hellerstein, Cuno and Congress: An Analysis of Proposed Federal Legislation 
Authorizing State Economic Development Incentives 3 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with authors) (“Congress must act with surgical precision if it is to perform the 
operation without killing the patient.”). 
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jurisprudence of the ECJ implies for the United States. We will examine 
implications for U.S. judicial decisions, tax treaty provisions, WTO constraints 
on taxation, European bilateral tax treaties, and the level of corporate taxation 
in the EU.  
The first issue is whether the ECJ’s view of the European requirements of 
nondiscrimination might find its way into the jurisprudence of U.S. courts. 
There are two contexts in which this might occur: first, in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the nondiscrimination requirements of the Commerce Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution in cases concerning state taxation of interstate 
commerce; and second, in judicial interpretations of the nondiscrimination 
requirements of U.S. bilateral income tax treaties. 
Commentators have frequently remarked—sometimes unfavorably—that in 
recent years the Supreme Court of the United States has paid attention to 
practices and judicial opinions from abroad in interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution.217 It would therefore be no surprise for the ECJ’s 
nondiscrimination jurisprudence, over time, to influence the Supreme Court’s 
decisions involving the constitutionality of U.S. state tax provisions. While, as 
we have made clear, these cases arise in an institutional and political context 
quite different from Europe’s, they often involve similar issues: the legality of 
measures by state governments that may discriminate against the free interstate 
movement of goods, services, labor, or capital. 
Our discussion of both the legal and fiscal policy implications of the ECJ’s 
corporate tax decisions and of the U.S. Supreme Court’s struggle with similar 
issues makes clear that we would not regard importation of ECJ jurisprudence 
by the U.S. Supreme Court as a positive development. We have emphasized 
the differences between the European and U.S. political structures and 
contexts, including the existence of a U.S. federal income tax.218 Most 
importantly, Europe has no legislative body with authority comparable to our 
Congress’s to act concerning these issues. Moreover, the ECJ’s 
nondiscrimination jurisprudence is, in our view, a quest for an unattainable 
goal in the absence of harmonized income taxes—the simultaneous 
achievement of neutrality based on both origin and destination. For that 
reason, among others, it is inherently unstable. Despite the serious 
shortcomings of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in this context, looking to the 
ECJ for help does not seem wise. 
 
217.  See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005). 
218.  See supra text accompanying note 183. 
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In the quite different context of federal courts interpreting the 
nondiscrimination clauses of bilateral U.S. income tax treaties, we think it is 
unlikely that the ECJ’s cases will have any noticeable impact on the decisions of 
U.S. courts.219 Recall that U.S. obligations under the tax treaties’ 
nondiscrimination clauses extend only to inbound investments—in this case, 
investments in the United States—by individuals or companies who are neither 
citizens nor residents of the United States. Both the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury and U.S. courts have taken a more limited view of the scope of this 
obligation than is implied by the ECJ’s view of the nondiscrimination 
requirements of the EC Treaty. The United States, for example, has long 
insisted that its thin-capitalization rules,220 which were intended principally to 
limit the ability of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents to strip earning out of 
the United States, are not discriminatory on the ground that they affect all 
entities exempt from U.S. taxation, not just foreigners.221 The ECJ, in contrast, 
struck down similar German restrictions on interest deductions.222 Additional 
examples exist. The ECJ, for example, has invalidated “exit taxes” that apply to 
taxpayers leaving one member state for another, while the United States allows 
such taxes.223 It seems unlikely that the ECJ decisions concerning 
discrimination against inbound investors will, without more, affect U.S. 
courts’ determinations of what constitutes discrimination under U.S. bilateral 
income tax treaties. 
A more likely course is that the ECJ cases finding discrimination against 
inbound investments will affect interpretations by the OECD of the 
nondiscrimination clause of its model treaties.224 Both ECJ interpretations of 
EC Treaty requirements and U.S. and OECD interpretations of the 
nondiscrimination requirements of income tax treaties require that the source 
country not treat a branch or subsidiary of a foreign company doing business 
 
219.  See also Bennett, supra note 30 (manuscript at 2-3, 31-32). 
220.  I.R.C. § 163(j) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005). 
221.  See Bennett, supra note 30 (manuscript at 19). 
222.  Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, 2002 E.C.R. I-11,779. 
223.  See Case C-9/02, De Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de 
l’Industrie, 2004 E.C.R. I-2409 (striking down a French tax for transfer of stock abroad). 
The United States, in contrast, believes that it is consistent with its treaty obligations to 
apply a toll charge under I.R.C. § 367(e)(2) (2000) when appreciated assets are transferred 
to foreign parents. I.R.S. Notice 87-66, 1987-2 C.B. 376 (rendered obsolete, but not repealed 
by, Rev. Rul. 2003-99, 2003-2 C.B. 388). Bennett, supra note 30 (manuscript at 42-43), 
concludes that a member state provision such as § 367(e)(2) would be struck down by the 
ECJ. 
224.  See OECD MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 30, art. 24; Bennett, supra note 30 (manuscript 
at 54-55). 
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in the source country (a “permanent establishment” in the language of the 
treaties) less favorably than it treats a domestic branch or subsidiary doing 
business in that country. The main distinction is that the ECJ’s 
nondiscrimination requirements also apply to foreign portfolio investors, while 
the income tax treaty rules do not. The ECJ’s cases finding discrimination in 
cases involving services supplied by a foreigner also go beyond the income tax 
treaties’ nondiscrimination requirements. Over time, the OECD model income 
tax treaty (and the OECD’s interpretations thereof) could move closer to the 
ECJ’s case law when inbound investments are at issue. Although the United 
States has always published its own model income tax treaty, which differs in 
some respects from the OECD model, the United States has also always been 
heavily influenced by the OECD model and its interpretations. We would not 
be surprised, therefore, if the U.S. model treaty also moved toward a more 
comprehensive view of discrimination regarding inbound investments.225 
Neither the OECD’s model income tax treaty nor any U.S. bilateral income 
tax treaty limits the taxation rights of the home country regarding outbound 
investments, other than those articles requiring that double taxation be 
addressed either through a credit for foreign taxes or an exemption for foreign 
income.226 Although the OECD has announced that it is reexamining the scope 
of nondiscrimination in the tax treaties,227 which conceivably could lead to a 
rule that applied to outgoing investment, we find it inconceivable that the 
United States would agree to expand its income tax treaties to mimic the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence in this context. The United States is simply not going to 
negotiate away its ability to provide incentives for domestic investments or 
other activities, such as research and development or domestic exploration for 
energy resources. 
A third forum in which the ECJ’s nondiscrimination jurisprudence might 
affect U.S. tax policy is the WTO. GATT (and its successors), which the WTO 
is charged with enforcing, prohibits subsidies for exports. As we have 
indicated, this has led the WTO (and its predecessors) to strike down certain 
U.S. income tax provisions on the ground that they provided benefits to 
domestic exporters not available to foreign producers. In 2004, Congress 
responded by substituting a special deduction available only to domestic 
manufacturing activities.228 Under WTO rules, as currently interpreted, this 
kind of subsidy is valid because it is available for the domestic manufacture of 
 
225.  See Bennett, supra note 30 (manuscript at 53-55). 
226.  See supra text accompanying note 32. 
227.  See Bennett, supra note 30 (manuscript at 3 n.4). 
228.  I.R.C. § 199 (West Supp. 2005). 
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goods, whether exported or not. The ECJ, on the other hand, would likely 
strike down such a provision as discrimination against foreign production—a 
violation of the free movement of capital or the free establishment guarantee of 
the EC Treaty. It is conceivable—but unlikely—that the WTO might also 
someday extend its reasoning regarding export subsidies to this type of subsidy 
on the ground that it inhibits the free movement of goods and services. This 
would be a major expansion of constraints on national legislation by the WTO, 
which, for both the legal and fiscal policy reasons we have discussed here, 
would be greatly resisted by many WTO members, including the United 
States. We do not expect the WTO to go this far in the absence of explicit 
authorization in a new treaty—authorization that surely will not be 
forthcoming. 
With regard to the extensive network of bilateral income tax treaties now in 
force throughout the world, the ECJ jurisprudence poses another fundamental 
question: Can the bilateral nature of these treaties be sustained when an EU 
member state is one of the parties?229 In a number of tax cases, the ECJ has 
made clear that, along with their other taxing powers, member states must 
exercise their rights to enter into tax treaties in a manner that is consistent with 
EU law.230 When the ECJ has found that a bilateral treaty violates one of the 
four freedoms, it has typically required the member state at fault to extend 
treaty benefits unilaterally to residents of other member states.231 Whether 
member states will be able to maintain treaties on a bilateral basis at all, 
however, has been called into question by the ECJ’s decision in the so-called 
Open-Skies cases.232 In those cases, the ECJ held that clauses in bilateral air 
transport agreements between the United States and various member states, 
which limited benefits to nationals of the contracting member state, violated 
the freedom of establishment requirement of the EC Treaty. This created a 
 
229.  See, e.g., Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court of Justice (Oct. 21, 
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (arguing for a multilateral tax treaty 
between the United States and the EU member states). 
230.  See, e.g., Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v. 
Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161; Case C-336/96, Gilly v. Directeur des 
services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793. 
231.  E.g., Saint-Gobain, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161. 
232.  Case C-475/98, Comm’n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. I-9797; Case C-471/98, Comm’n v. 
Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-9681; Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-9519; 
Case C-476/98, Comm’n v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. I-9855; Case C-472/98, Comm’n v. 
Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. I-9741; Case C-468/98, Comm’n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-9575; 
Case C-466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-9427; see also Georg W. Kofler, 
European Taxation Under an ‘Open Sky’: LoB Clauses in Tax Treaties Between the U.S. and EU 
Member States, 35 TAX NOTES INT’L 45 (2004). 
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dilemma since it is not possible for a European member state to extend the 
treaty benefits granted to it by the United States unilaterally to nationals of 
other member states. Nor could any member state force the United States to 
allow all EU nationals to enjoy the treaty benefits. Ultimately, the bilateral air 
transport treaties were saved when the United States agreed to new language 
allowing ownership and control by EU nationals of other member states. As a 
result, British nationals, for example, may now own and control a French 
airline and take advantage of the French-U.S. treaty.233 
Bilateral income tax treaties between EU member states and the United 
States now routinely contain “limitations on benefits” clauses, which are 
intended to limit the treaties’ benefits to tax residents of the contracting 
state.234 The treaty between the United States and the Netherlands, for 
example, allows its reduced withholding tax rates on dividends, interest, and 
royalties to companies only if “more than 30 percent of the aggregate vote and 
value . . . is owned, directly or indirectly, by qualified persons resident in the 
Netherlands.”235 While their purposes are generally the same, the details of 
these limitations clauses vary, depending on when the treaty was negotiated 
and sometimes on specific bilateral considerations.236 The ECJ’s Open-Skies 
decisions suggest that these clauses may have to be renegotiated to permit 
benefits to nationals of other member states. 
The Open-Skies cases, along with certain tax cases,237 raise the more 
fundamental question of whether any EU country will be able to enter into a 
treaty with a non-EU country that treats its own nationals more favorably than 
nationals of any other EU member state. The crucial issue for the United States 
would then be whether the ECJ has imposed a type of most-favored-nation 
rule that, in essence, overrides the bilateral nature of the tax treaty. An opinion 
by the Advocate General in a recent ECJ case involving claims by a German 
resident for a wealth tax exemption the same as that granted by the 
Netherlands in a bilateral treaty to residents of Belgium suggested that—at 
 
233.  No intra-European bilateral transport agreements have, however, been entered into since 
the Open-Skies decisions. 
234.  See, e.g., U.S. Model Income and Capital Tax Convention Treaty art. 22 (1996) (U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury). 
235.  Tax Convention, U.S.-Neth., art. 26, ¶ 4, Dec. 18, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-6 (1993). 
236.  Compare Tax Convention, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 28, Aug. 29, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-10 
(1990) (establishing limitations on benefits), with Tax Convention, supra note 235, art. 26, 
¶ 4. 
237.  Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v. 
Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161; Hans van den Hurk, Is the Ability of the 
Member States To Conclude Tax Treaties Chained Up?, 13 EC TAX REV. 17 (2004). 
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least for bilateral treaties between EU member states—one member state could 
not grant benefits to nationals of another member state without making similar 
benefits available to nationals of all member states.238 In allowing the German 
complainant benefits equivalent to those available to any Belgian national 
under the treaty, the Advocate General stated: 
[A]ccepting reciprocal obligations to another member state which limit 
the freedom of movement of the nationals of European non-member 
countries is contrary to Community law. The fact must not be 
overlooked that national provisions, which include validly concluded 
and ratified international treaties, must not infringe the fundamental 
freedoms of the European legal system. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . I am aware of the dangers which the foregoing considerations 
imply for the equilibrium and reciprocity which prevail in the system of 
double-taxation treaties, but those difficulties must not become obstacles to 
the establishment of the single market. . . . [T]he States in question have a 
duty to seek other formulae which, whilst achieving the objective 
sought, do not, in breach of Community law, prejudice the citizens of 
other Member States.239  
The ECJ reached a different conclusion.240 It upheld the Netherlands law 
allowing a wealth tax exemption only to its own residents on the ground that 
“the situation of a resident and that of a non-resident are as a rule not 
comparable.”241 And—citing arguments by a number of member states that a 
contrary holding would entail “danger” and “legal uncertainty” for bilateral tax 
treaties—the court also found that the more favorable treatment granted by the 
Netherlands to a resident of Belgium under the bilateral treaty did not violate 
 
238.  Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst (Oct. 26, 2004) (opinion of Advocate 
General Colomer), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case 
C-376/03”). 
239.  Id. ¶¶ 97, 101 (emphasis added). 
240.  Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 349 (July 
5, 2005); see also Case C-374/04, Test Claimants v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue ¶¶ 97-103 
(Feb. 23, 2006) (opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed), http://www.curia.eu.int/en/ 
content/juris/index.htm (search for “Case C-374/04”) (declining to extend bilateral tax 
treaty benefits to third-country residents). 
241.  Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS ¶ 34. 
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EC law.242 The court, however, did not override a prior precedent holding that 
a member state must extend bilateral income tax treaty benefits to a permanent 
establishment owned by nationals of a member state not a party to the 
treaty.243 Instead, its emphasis in the wealth tax case was on the reciprocal 
rights and obligations that are an “inherent consequence of bilateral double 
taxation conventions.”244 
Given their conflicting conclusions, it is difficult to know what to make of 
the ECJ’s cases involving bilateral tax treaties. The court’s language suggests 
that the results will depend on whether the court concludes that the resident 
and nonresident are “in similar circumstances,” which seems quite fact specific. 
The court’s decision in the Netherlands wealth tax case suggests that it does 
not intend to impose a general most-favored-nation requirement on bilateral 
tax treaties, and it appears, for now at least, that the court will not lightly 
undermine even intra-European bilateral tax treaties.245 The great divergence 
between the opinions of the Advocate General and the court in this regard 
deserves emphasis, and the court’s decision has been strongly criticized by 
some advocates of European integration.246 The resulting uncertainty 
regarding bilateral tax treaties also makes it unclear whether the ECJ will 
uphold limitations on benefits clauses. 
At a minimum, the United States must take into account potential 
interventions of the ECJ when negotiating bilateral tax treaties with EU 
member states. For the longer term, the United States should begin 
considering what kind of treaty it would be willing to negotiate with Europe as 
a whole.247 In the airline context, the United States went to considerable 
lengths to avoid a multilateral European treaty, principally to continue pressure 
on the British to expand landing rights at London’s Heathrow Airport. In the 
income tax context, given the wide variations in both tax rates and tax 
administrative capabilities among the twenty-five EU Member states, the 
United States should also move slowly, if at all, toward a one-size-fits-all 
European treaty. But over time that may be exactly what the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence will demand. 
 
242.  Id. ¶¶ 48, 63. 
243.  Id. ¶ 56 (citing Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung 
Deutschland v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161). 
244.  Id. ¶ 61. 
245.  See Marcel Buur, ECJ Rejects ‘Most Favored Nation’ Argument in Dutch-German Tax Case, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, July 7, 2005, 2005 WTD 129-2 (LEXIS). 
246.  See, e.g., van Thiel, supra note 169, at 455-57. 
247.  See Mason, supra note 229 (arguing for a multilateral tax treaty between the EU and the 
United States as a response to the ECJ decisions). 
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Finally—and perhaps most importantly—United States policymakers must 
begin to address how our nation should respond if, over time, the effect of the 
ECJ’s corporate tax jurisprudence is to dismantle corporate income taxes in 
Europe. The European retreat from shareholder-credit corporate tax 
integration has already had some impact on U.S. treaty negotiations with 
certain European partners and may have influenced the U.S. decision to pursue 
a dividend exclusion (or lower shareholder tax rate for dividends) rather than 
shareholder credits, although a 1992 Treasury Report recommending this 
course undoubtedly played a more important role.248  
As we have discussed, one thread of the ECJ’s corporate tax decisions has 
struck down member state provisions designed to limit taxpayers’ ability to 
shift income from high- to low-tax member states. Here we have emphasized 
the court’s nullification in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case of Germany’s provision 
inhibiting earnings stripping by excessive interest deductions and the Marks & 
Spencer case, which requires the United Kingdom to allow foreign losses to 
offset domestic earnings. But a variety of other limitations are also in jeopardy. 
Many commentators believe, for example, that the ECJ is likely to find that 
widely used provisions limiting the ability of companies to use “controlled 
foreign corporations” to shift mobile income from higher- to lower-tax 
member states violate the free movement of capital or the freedom of 
establishment articles of the EC Treaty.249 Decisions like these threaten to 
make collecting corporate income taxes in Europe far more difficult. 
There are a number of potential responses by the United States if Europe 
becomes a place where corporate income can easily escape tax.250 Some 
policymakers, concerned with the potential for U.S. corporations to shift 
manufacturing and other investments to Europe—policymakers principally 
interested in maintaining capital export neutrality—will urge provisions 
imposing greater U.S. income taxes on such investments. Other policymakers, 
concerned with maintaining the competitiveness of U.S. corporations doing 
 
248.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 75. The United States currently taxes dividends 
at a fifteen percent rate. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (West Supp. 2005). President Bush had 
proposed a one hundred percent exclusion for dividends from earnings on which corporate 
taxes had already been paid.  
249.  See supra note 102. 
250.  We have already seen something of the way the debate will unfold in the controversy over 
Treasury’s issuance of I.R.S. Notice 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 433, which responded to certain tax 
planning techniques reducing corporate taxes in Europe. In that Notice, the IRS attacked 
transactions that reduced taxes of U.S. corporations in foreign countries. That unleashed an 
“explosion of criticism” attacking the Treasury and the IRS for attempting to use U.S. taxes 
as a “backstop” for “the tax systems of other countries.” See H. David Rosenbloom, 
International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 157 (2000). 
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business in Europe vis-à-vis European corporations operating there—
policymakers principally interested in capital import neutrality—will not only 
resist any efforts to tighten U.S. taxes on foreign investments, but will also 
urge reductions in U.S. corporate income taxes in an effort to make 
investments in the United States more attractive.251 Thus, the ECJ decisions 
raise the possibility of a United States-European race to the bottom in 
corporate income taxation. Should this occur, either government spending 
would have to be reduced or the lost revenues would have to be replaced by 
other taxes. 
conclusion 
In an effort to advance economic and political integration in the EU, the 
European Court of Justice has decided numerous cases striking down 
provisions of member states’ corporate income taxes. These decisions have 
been intended to promote the four freedoms guaranteed by the European 
treaties—the free movement of goods, services, labor, and capital—and to 
eliminate discrimination based on nationality. In the process, the court has 
developed a jurisprudence of nondiscrimination that goes beyond such 
requirements in international trade or tax treaties. 
We have shown here that the ECJ’s nondiscrimination jurisprudence 
reveals an impossible quest: to eliminate discrimination based on both the 
origin and destination of economic activity. We have also shown that this quest 
necessarily must fail in the absence of harmonized corporate income tax bases 
and rates among EU member states. This implies that the court will find it 
necessary somewhere along the way to retreat, creating not only legal 
uncertainty, but ultimately doctrinal incoherence. 
At the same time, the ECJ’s jurisprudence is restricting member states’ 
flexibility over their own fiscal policies in a manner that conflicts sharply with 
the member states’ retention of the power to veto any European income tax 
legislation. The constraints that the ECJ’s view of nondiscrimination places on 
member states’ abilities to use incentives to stimulate their own domestic 
economies makes it difficult for member states to use tax policy as a way to 
respond to recessions. This problem is most pressing for those member states 
 
251.  The discussion in the text assumes the continuing existence of a corporate income tax in the 
United States. Some analysts, however, have urged substituting some form of consumption 
tax for the current U.S. corporate income tax. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX 
REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 151-
90 (2005). Such a development would, of course, put pressure on the Europeans either to 
protect or eliminate their own corporate income taxes. 
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that have joined the monetary union and have thereby given up their ability to 
use national monetary policy to combat recession. 
We cannot predict where the dilemmas we have identified will lead. 
Europe, we think, has only two options: greater harmonization through 
coordination of income tax bases and rates, or greater restraint by the ECJ, 
either through its own decisionmaking or externally imposed by the member 
states. The resistance of a number of important member states to European 
harmonization is firm, and any harmonization of tax rates seems a long way 
off. So, in the near term at least, we expect the ECJ to become more restrained. 
Failing that, difficulties for the member states in fashioning their own tax 
policies will grow. 
While it is tempting, from this side of the Atlantic, simply to watch these 
European developments with detachment, the United States’s political and 
economic relationships with Europe are too extensive for our nation to remain 
unaffected. At a minimum, we would expect the ECJ’s nondiscrimination 
jurisprudence concerning inbound investments to influence and ultimately 
enlarge the OECD and U.S. interpretations of related nondiscrimination 
provisions in income tax treaties. More fundamentally, the ECJ decisions 
render the future of bilateral treaties between the United States and EU 
member states uncertain. And if the U.S. Supreme Court were to become 
convinced that the ECJ’s interpretations are appropriate for the United States, 
the Court might impose new constraints on the flexibility of our states to enact 
tax incentives promoting local investments. 
Ultimately, if the ECJ continues along its current path, the ongoing ability 
of both EU member states and the United States to rely on corporate income 
taxes as an important source of government revenues could be threatened. 
Some would welcome such a development; others would abhor it. But none 
can deny that diminishing corporate revenues would put significant financial 
pressure on countries already strapped to finance government expenditures— 
expenditures that seem destined to grow as all our populations age. 
Finally, nothing we have said here should be taken as reflecting opposition 
to greater federalization of Europe. We emphasize two points: First, the U.S. 
experience amply demonstrates that successful federalization does not demand 
the limitations on member states’ taxing autonomy that the ECJ appears to be 
imposing. In particular, it is unnecessary to restrict member states’ ability to 
use tax incentives to stimulate their domestic economies. Second, as we have 
shown, the tax decisions of the ECJ, spurred by the tax policy objectives of the 
European Commission, conflict directly with the member states’ retention of 
veto power over issues of direct taxation. The draft European Constitution 
does not change this unanimity requirement, undoubtedly reflecting the view 
of at least some member states that retention of taxing authority is a crucial 
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aspect of their sovereignty. To be sure, greater federalization may require 
giving up this autonomy. If that is to occur, however, we believe that such 
change should come through democratic processes, with the critical decisions 
made by elected representatives rather than by appointed judges. This will 
require new European constitutional arrangements. When Europe reconsiders 
its constitutional arrangements, concerns like those we have expressed here will 
undoubtedly also emerge in legal contexts other than taxation.252 
 
252.  See, e.g., Thomas Ferenczi, La Cour de justice est accusée d’outrepasser ses compétences, LE 
MONDE, Jan. 13, 2006, at 8 (reporting the view of several member states that the ECJ had 
exceeded its judicial role in cases involving the role of women in the German army and the 
access of foreign students to Austrian universities). 
